

EU's role in the world: how can EU climate diplomacy stimulate greater ambition?

Deliverable D3.7: Discussion papers on the impact on the EU's main partners dealing with the respective dimensions (Paper 5)

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1. Introduction

In July 2021, the European Commission announced the Fit for 55 package of climate initiatives, which implement an increase in the European Union's (EU) ambition for 2030 from the at least 40% reduction from 1990 levels presented in the EU's first NDC, to a level of at least 55% over the same period, with a wider scope. In describing this package of initiatives, the Commission announced that:

The Fit for 55 Package cements the EU's global leadership by action and by example in the fight against climate change. However, EU action alone is not enough and cannot deliver the global emission reduction the world needs. The EU remains fully committed to the multilateral global order and calls upon partners around the world to work together. This is why the EU is working with the G7, the G20 and other international partners to show that increased climate ambition, economic prosperity and sustainable growth can go hand in hand (European Commission, 2021a).

The above highlights two avenues the EU has to significantly impact global emissions: (i) leading by action and by example, through its own headline ambition and buttressing policies and measures; and (ii) leading through international engagement and diplomacy – encouraging and enabling efforts by its partners to reduce emissions, adapt to climate impacts, and address loss and damage, recognising their respective capabilities.

It has been said that an actor qualifies as a 'leader' in global climate governance if it is more ambitious than others in the pursuit of the common good, and that actors such as the EU qualify for international climate leadership only if they pursue ambitious policy objectives (relative to other actors) toward the multilaterally agreed goals as validated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Oberthür & Dupont, 2021). The EU has demonstrated such leadership through its development of comprehensive and coherent policies and legislative initiatives to address climate change, and now its Fit for 55 package.

However, relative leadership is not an end in itself. In view of the urgency of the climate challenge, the EU could be said to be exhibiting climate leadership if it supports a global narrative that is consistent with what best available science and equity demands, and if it supports this narrative with action that is also consistent with the scale of effort and ambition that science and equity demand.

This paper asks:

1. Is the EU's own scale, pace and scope of climate ambition commensurate with the scale of the challenge?
2. How (and where) can the EU best exert its climate diplomacy between now and 2025?
3. How can the EU's support and other actions give confidence to partner countries in increasing their climate ambition between now and 2030?

4. Is the EU showing adequate climate leadership in multilateral treaty processes outside the UNFCCC and is there opportunity for it to do more?

The paper first considers opportunities for the EU to stimulate greater global ambition on mitigation, adaptation and support for developing countries under the UNFCCC. It then considers opportunities for EU engagement outside the formal UNFCCC framework.

Recommendations are provided in boxes at the conclusion of each section and consolidated in section 4 of this paper.

2. Leadership by action and by example

The Paris Agreement has as one of its three core aims, “[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C...”.

In Glasgow at COP26, in 2021, Parties reaffirmed the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, and “resolve[d] to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C” (Decision 1/CMA.3, 2021). They recognised that this “requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty” (Decision 1/CMA.3, 2021 para. 23).

According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, limiting warming to 1.5°C requires global emissions to **peak by 2025**, reach **43% below 2019 levels by 2030** and reach net zero by mid-century, in pathways with limited or no overshoot (IPCC, 2022). The 2022 NDC Synthesis Report indicates that existing NDCs, if delivered, would reduce emission levels by only **-0.3% below 2019 levels** by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2022). In addition, current pledges now in place, if implemented, are estimated to lead to a best estimate of 2.1-2.9°C of warming depending on underlying assumptions (UNFCCC, 2022).

Meanwhile, the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report indicates that *very high risks* from climate impacts are likely to be felt at lower temperature increases than previously thought for all five categories of Reasons for Concern (unique and threatened systems; frequency and severity of extreme weather events; global distribution and balance of impacts; total economic and ecological impact; risk of irreversible large scale and abrupt transitions). For example, while the 2018 IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C of Global Warming found the transition from *high* to *very high* risks for unique and threatened systems to occur **between 1.5°C and 2°C**, the AR6 assesses this transition to start **above 1.2°C warming** (IPCC WGII, 2022 p. 2487). Accordingly, the rapid achievement of net zero emissions, and net negative emissions, has become **even more urgent**.

In May 2021, the IEA produced *Net Zero by 2050 – a roadmap for the Global Energy Sector*. This document sets out a narrow global pathway to the achievement of net zero and calls for all governments to strengthen and then successfully implement their climate policies. In presenting

this report, the Head of the IEA Fatih Birol, warned that “If governments are serious about the climate crisis, **there can be no new investments in oil, gas and coal, from now** – from this year” (Harvey, 2021) (emphasis added). In November 2022, he emphasised that “the chances of 1.5C are narrowing, but **it is still achievable**”, and that to claim otherwise would not only be “factually incorrect” but would “play into the hands of fossil fuel proponents” (Harvey, 2022) (emphasis added).

At the outset of COP27, UN Secretary General Guterres tried to convey the seriousness of the situation: “we are on a highway to climate hell with our foot on the accelerator” (Guterres, 2022).

2.1 EU narrative

In the years since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the EU has become consistent in referencing a 1.5°C limit, referring to the need to “keep 1.5 within reach” and referring to the decade 2020-2030 as “this critical decade” for securing the necessary pathway.

However, the EU’s messaging has not kept pace with scientific developments or analyses of the action needed to meet Paris Agreement goals. The EU has also sent mixed messages on the need for a halt to fossil fuel reliance.

The EU’s initial NDC, communicated in 2015, had a headline ambition of an at least 40% reduction below 1990 levels by 2030. In 2020, in announcing the EU’s enhanced 55% target and supporting package, EU representatives described this target as “realistic”, “feasible”, “balanced” and “prudent” (European Commission, 2020b) with “the EU leading the way to a green recovery”, and the Commission “doing everything in its power to keep promises made to Europeans” to “make Europe the first climate neutral continent in the world, by 2050” (emphasis added; Ibid.).

In February 2022, EU Council conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy in preparation for COP27 called for an “immediate end to all financing of new coal infrastructure **in third countries**, and for discouraging all further investments into fossil fuel based energy infrastructure projects **in third countries**, unless they are fully consistent with an ambitious, clearly defined pathway towards climate neutrality in line with the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement and best available science” (emphasis added; General Secretariat of the Council, 2022).

Subsequently, at COP27, the EU supported India’s call for a **phase down of all fossil fuels**, so long as it built upon the Glasgow Climate Pact’s encouragement to Parties to accelerate efforts toward the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies (Sarkar, 2022). This language could not be agreed by all Parties but the issue will likely return for discussion (Climate Home, 2023).

On March 9 2023, the EU approved a common position in preparation for COP28, building incrementally on agreed Glasgow language (EU Council, 2023). As part of this position, in paragraph 31,

The Council considers... that the shift towards a climate neutral economy will require the global phase out of unabated fossil fuels, as defined by the IPCC, and a peak in their consumption already in the near term, while recognizing a transitional role for natural gas. The EU will systematically promote and call for a global move towards energy systems free of unabated fossil fuels well ahead of 2050. In this regard, the Council recalls the commitment taken at COP26 to close the book on unabated coal power through a phase down, and, calls for a resolute and just world-wide transformation towards climate neutrality, including a phasing out of unabated coal in energy production and – as a first step – an immediate end to all financing of new coal infrastructure in third countries. (emphasis added)

The EU's evolving language could be bolder and clearer given what is at stake. To the extent the EU's intention is to signal the need for an unambiguous shift away from fossil fuels in all countries (use of "global phase out" rather than "phase down"), this message is muddled and undermined by vague language ("consider that the shift towards... will require"), no stated timeframe ("already in the near term"), with qualifying exceptions ("while recognizing a transitional role for natural gas") and an external focus ("in third countries").

This message is also undermined by recent actions, that have sent mixed messages on the imperative to eliminate fossil fuels. The EU or its Member States have, for example:

- signed **purchase agreements for the import of fossil fuels from developing countries**, while making investments in mitigation and adaptation in developing countries (Climate Action Tracker, 2023a);
- referenced the necessity of the **1.5°C limit, intergenerational equity and solidarity**, while presenting a level of ambition that does not fully reflect the EU's historical contribution to cumulative emissions or its capabilities from a "fair shares" perspective (Climate Action Tracker, 2023a);
- supported the "**Powering past coal**" initiative under the UK COP Presidency in 2021, but in 2022 allowed an increasing role of coal power plants in the EU electricity sector to save gas and compensate for a significant decrease in electricity generation from nuclear and hydropower plants (Climate Action Tracker, 2023a);
- announced the European Green Deal and related initiatives to deliver the EU's 2030 NDC - - and then expressed concern with the **US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)**, which through different means, and while WTO-incompatible in some respects (Kleimann et al., 2023; Murray, 2023), presents a package of initiatives to help deliver the US's own NDC targets;
- participated in a Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with Senegal, to help shift Senegal away from fossil fuels, while simultaneously entering into **gas purchase agreements** with Senegal (Larson, 2022);

- included **fossil gas and nuclear energy as environmentally sustainable economic activities** under the EU Taxonomy (European Commission, 2022b) which aims to prevent greenwashing (Hernandez, 2022), allowing the construction of facilities that produce electricity from fossil fuels to be considered sustainable under some conditions, which has led to legal action (Abnett, 2023);
- **planned investments in gas infrastructure** within the EU under the REPowerEU Plan, at a cost of upwards of Euro 10 billion, while calling for an end to new fossil fuel projects in other areas of the world (Siddi, 2023);
- created a carve out from the prohibition on funding fossil fuel-based energy infrastructure projects in third countries, allowing support for these projects where they are “**fully consistent with an ambitious, clearly defined pathway towards climate neutrality in line with the long-term objectives of the PA and best available science**” (General Secretariat of the Council, 2022 at para. 10);
- referenced the “**polluter pays principle**” in announcing the discontinuation of free allocation of allowances to the aviation sector from 2026, but not yet regulated to constrain the non-CO₂ impacts of aviation in these allocations; and
- publicly struggled with **internal disagreements** on the EU Green Transport legislation that would ban combustion engines from 2035.

There are short term drivers for many of these actions. Most prominently, the war in Ukraine has led to a scramble for energy supplies across Europe. Political necessity within the EU leads to compromises and there are existing investment commitments that must be met. Nevertheless, weak messaging, inconsistent actions, and calls for others to take action without a commitment to do the same (e.g., calling for the cessation of funding support to fossil fuel infrastructure in third countries, while continuing to fund fossil infrastructure within the EU) all **undermine a clear and consistent narrative on the need to phase out all fossil fuels**.

On March 20, 2023, with the release of the IPCC’s AR6 Summary for Policymakers, UN Secretary General Guterres warned that “[t]he rate of temperature rise in the last half century is the highest in 2,000 years,” “[c]oncentrations of carbon dioxide are at their highest in at least 2 million years. The climate time-bomb is ticking” (Reuters, 2023). He called for an **acceleration agenda**, massively fast-tracking action to meet the achievable 1.5°C limit and more specifically called for:

- OECD countries to commit to reaching net zero as close as possible to 2040 and emerging economies to commit to reaching net zero as close as possible to 2050;
- no new coal, the phasing out of coal by 2030 in OECD countries, and 2040 in all other countries;
- ending all international public and private funding of coal;

- ensuring net zero electricity generation by 2035 for all developed countries and 2040 for the rest of the world;
- ceasing all licensing or funding of new oil and gas — consistent with the findings of the International Energy Agency;
- stopping any expansion of existing oil and gas reserves;
- shifting subsidies from fossil fuels to a just energy transition; and
- establishing a global phase down of existing oil and gas production, compatible with the 2050 global net zero target (Guterres, 2023) (emphasis added).

Currently, only some EU member states aim to achieve climate neutrality in advance of 2050 (Finland is aiming for climate neutrality by 2035, and Germany and Denmark are aiming for 2045). Nevertheless, if the EU wishes to be consistent with what best available science and equity require to meet the 1.5°C limit, and wishes to continue to be viewed as a climate leader, the EU’s narrative will need to respond to and accept the challenge of these UNSG targets. It will also need to amplify, project and endeavour to sell these targets to its negotiating partners.

Accordingly, there is a need for a recalibration of the EU’s messaging to internalise these targets. Open reflection on the practical challenges of just transitions in the EU’s own coal-dependent economies, and an explanation of the short-term need for narrowly circumscribed gas investments (e.g., to support countries struggling with issues of energy access or stability), despite the EU’s unwavering longer-term commitment to a phase out of all fossil fuels, would go some way toward explaining inconsistencies in the EU’s messaging.

1.A. Opportunities for the EU to stimulate greater global ambition through the EU’s narrative:

- Recalibrate the EU narrative on climate action to internalise the UN Secretary General’s acceleration agenda.
- Embrace the UN Secretary General’s call for OECD countries to reach net zero “as close as possible to 2040” as a guide for the EU and OECD countries in developing or updating of their NDCs and net zero targets. Earlier net zero targets will create the political space for developing countries that are able to do so to bring forward their own net zero target timeframes.
- Work toward a complete coal phaseout by 2030 across all EU member states, consistent with the UN Secretary General’s call for a phaseout by 2030 for members of the OECD and by 2040 for all other countries, and a halt to all new fossil fuel exploration, development and licensing.

- Maintain greater consistency in messaging on the need to accelerate the phase out of all fossil fuels across all countries, both within and outside the EU.
- Communicate openly the implementation challenges the EU is facing as a grouping of diverse countries in its own efforts to phase out fossil fuels and to implement the raft of policies it has already developed.
- Communicate messages that can resonate in challenging policy areas that require behavioural change – e.g., eat green, travel green.
- Acknowledge the accelerating impacts that are expected if the 1.5°C limit is exceeded, within the EU and elsewhere.
- Express a desire to go net negative in the longer term.

2.2 Mitigation ambition that is 1.5°C aligned

Consistent with Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, the EU’s NDC is economy-wide, covers all sectors and all gases, and is supported by a package of domestic policies capable of delivering the NDC’s pledged reductions. This NDC is supported by a broad set of policy tools that can be tightened to deliver greater ambition over time (e.g., ETS, Effort Sharing Regulation, Renewable Energy Directive, LULUCF Regulation etc.). The EU’s separate target for the land sector provides transparency.

However, one-third of the way into “this critical decade”, as cumulative emissions continue to increase and climate impacts accelerate, the EU’s “at least 55%” headline NDC target and net zero by 2050 aspirations may seem moderate. The EU is responsible for roughly 8% of current GHG emissions and roughly 18% percent of total historical global CO₂-equivalent emissions (Statista, 2023). In the context of the Paris Agreement’s ambitious goals, and in applying the principle of CBDR, it has been suggested that the EU’s ambitions, both for domestic emission reductions (Cremona, 2023) and for the support of mitigation efforts abroad, must go still higher for the EU to be termed a climate leader and to be considered as presenting its highest possible ambition (Climate Action Tracker, 2023a; Climate Analytics, 2022a).

1.5oC consistency

The EU has consistently presented its NDC as in line with 1.5°C. However, in November 2022, the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) rated the EU’s 55% target and policies to be consistent with a 2°C limit, rather than the 1.5°C limit that the EU has agreed to pursue. Climate Analytics has found that to be 1.5°C compatible, the EU27 would need to cut its domestic emissions faster than currently planned and can feasibly reach net zero GHG emissions between 2040 and 2047 (Climate Analytics, 2022b).

The CAT also found that **the EU is not meeting its “fair share” contribution** to global climate action and rated the EU’s efforts **“insufficient.”**¹ Substantial improvement is needed, the CAT found, in both the EU’s domestic emissions target and in the form of additional support for emission reductions achieved in developing countries through finance: “to improve its rating, the EU should strengthen its emissions reduction target **to at least 62% (excl. LULUCF)** below 1990 levels, adopt policies necessary to reach this goal, and significantly increase its support for climate action in developing and least developed countries” (emphasis added; Climate Action Tracker, 2023b).

A 2022 analysis by Climate Analytics assessed the EU’s “highest plausible ambition” under 1.5°C compatible pathways, filtered to meet sustainability constraints. It found that the EU27 can feasibly reduce its GHG emissions between **61-73% below 1990 levels excluding LULUCF**, or by **64-77% by 2030 including LULUCF**, relative to 1990 levels (emphasis added; Climate Analytics, 2022b).

Accordingly, there is room for the EU to step up the scale of its headline ambition. In 2022, Frans Timmermans announced in a speech to the COP27 that the EU was already likely to overachieve its announced 2030 55% target and deliver at least a 57% reduction. The EU has indicated that it stands ready to submit an enhanced NDC (Council of the EU, 2023) after the conclusion of negotiations on the essential elements of the Fit for 55 package. In such a submission, a strong signal of leadership would be to express, in addition to its legally binding pledge, a more ambitious aspirational or stretch goal for 2030, and/or acknowledge that the EU hopes to significantly overachieve its 2030 NDC and will report updated 2030 projections in coming years.

It is also well-known that the EU can accelerate action when it is determined to do so – as seen with the rapid development of the REPowerEU Plan, which was developed in three months to support a transition away from Russian gas, and which massively scales up and speeds up the EU’s commitment to renewable energy (European Commission, 2022h; Siddi, 2023).

Net zero timeframe

Article 4.19 of the Paris Agreement encourages all Parties to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LT-LEDS), mindful of Article 2 and taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

The EU submitted its LT-LEDS to the UNFCCC on March 6, 2020 (European Union, 2020). That document refers back to the EU’s vision “to achieve a climate neutral EU by 2050 in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and in the light of the latest available science and of the need to step up global climate action” as endorsed by the EU Council (European Union, 2020).

¹ The fair share assessment considers both mitigation effort to be achieved domestically, and mitigation supported abroad.

If global net zero emissions need to be reached by 2050 for 1.5°C consistency, it is to be expected that the EU and its EU member states will reach this net zero marker before 2050. There is reasonable expectation that developed country Parties will be quicker to peak and rapidly reduce their emissions than their developing country partners, and quicker to reach climate neutrality than their less-advanced country partners with fewer financial resources, on the basis of equity, and in light of their ability and their historical responsibility.

The UNSG has now made this issue of equity explicit, in calling for an acceleration of effort from the EU and others, and the bringing forward of net zero timeframes from advanced economies to 2040. The High Level Champion for the UK Presidency's COP26 team, Nigel Topping, stated in January that the world could reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions in the early 2040s, substantially ahead of the mid-century climate target, if governments set stretch goals and make bold policy decisions (Harvey, 2023). Again, analysis by Climate Analytics has found that by rapidly reducing fossil fuels while preserving and expanding the LULUCF sink, net zero GHG emissions could be reached by 2040 in the EU27, a full decade ahead of the current target (Climate Analytics, 2022b).

Accordingly, there is room for the EU to step up both its headline target and the timeframe for delivery of its net zero target.

1.B Opportunities for the EU to stimulate greater global mitigation ambition through its targets:

- Ensure action to implement all elements of the Fit for 55 package, to demonstrate progress in the delivery of the EU's NDC.
- Report on progress against internal EU targets and be open and forthright about barriers and challenges encountered.
- Update the EU's 2030 NDC to reflect the greater ambition made possible through adoption of key legislation related to the Fit for 55 package and explain how this NDC is 1.5°C aligned.
- Acknowledge that the EU hopes to significantly overachieve its NDC and will report updated 2030 projections in coming years.
- Express, in addition to its NDC target, a more ambitious aspirational or stretch goal for 2030 that encompasses the fair shares level of ambition.
- In response to the UNSG's challenge, express an intent to reach net zero emissions well before 2050, *and aiming for 2040*.
- Signal the need for advanced economies to go net negative in the longer term, which may give greater confidence to developing countries gearing up to participate in cooperative approaches.

- Encourage all governments to enhance their existing NDCs by presenting economy-wide targets that cover all sectors and all gases, aiming for a comprehensive set of second NDCs.

2.3 Adaptation

The Paris Agreement has as one of its three aims, under Article 2.1(b), “to strengthen the global climate change response by increasing the ability of all to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience.”

Although adaptation challenges and solutions are usually context and region specific, countries recognised in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement that adaptation is a “global challenge faced by all, also with international dimensions, and that adaptation is a key component of, and makes a contribution to, the long-term global response to climate change.” Article 7.1 established the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of Paris Agreement temperature goal. governments are still engaged in discussions on what this goal entails and how to measure progress toward its attainment.

The Paris Agreement strengthens previous efforts on adaptation through four channels: (a) broadening the normative framing around adaptation, (b) integrating stronger adaptation commitments from state actors, b) being explicit about the multi-level nature of adaptation governance, and (d) strengthening mechanisms for enhanced transparency on assessing adaptation progress (Lesnikowski et al., 2017). Article 7 also places emphasis on the importance of support and international cooperation, and the importance of taking into account the needs of developing countries. The Paris Agreement also requests countries to engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including plans, policies and/or contributions. In addition, countries should, periodically report on their adaptation priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and action, as appropriate.

Despite broad acknowledgement of the urgency and relevance of adaptation action, much more needs to be done. The latest UN Adaptation Gap Report concisely expresses progress to date as “too little, too slow”; although there is positive and relevant progress, important gaps remain in most areas of action, including planning, implementation and finance (UNEP, 2022b).

Adaptation is indeed a priority for most nations, especially for developing countries that face financial and capacity constraints in efforts to properly manage and address climate risks. Developing countries have consistently called for a more balanced approach between mitigation and adaptation, especially regarding funding access and the adequacy of finance support. In particular, vulnerable countries such as the SIDS and LDCs have called for scaled up support for implementing their national adaptation plans.

Nevertheless, public climate finance for adaptation remains much smaller than public finance for mitigation, and a big financial gap persists that impedes progress by developing countries. In addition, developing countries doubt the effectiveness and suitability of private sector involvement in financing adaptation actions, where financial returns are not attractive or at times non-existent.

EU narrative and action

The European Union has made efforts to mainstream adaptation as an EU-wide policy, and has made progress in developing adaptation planning instruments at different levels. Among the latest of these outcomes are: the EU Climate Law (2021); the EU Adaptation Strategy (2021); and the EU Adaptation Communication (2021). Through these policy documents, the EU presents its views and priority areas of action on adaptation, which also serve as guidance or reference for the development of policies in other substantive areas.

The EU Climate Law (EU, 2021) makes explicit reference to several provisions of the Paris Agreement. It provides an enhanced EU-wide institutional framework that promotes mainstreaming of climate change across several areas. On adaptation, among other provisions, the Law requests:

- the relevant Union institutions and the member states to ensure continuous progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change;
- the Commission to adopt and regularly review an EU-level strategy on adaptation to climate change in line with the Paris Agreement; and
- member states to adopt, regularly update, and implement national adaptation strategies and plans, taking into consideration the Union strategy on adaptation to climate change (EU, 2021).

The EU Adaptation Strategy and EU Adaptation Communication in turn provide more granular insights on EU views on adaptation, priorities, progress made to date and the EU role within the international community.

The EU NDC does not explicitly consider adaptation. Instead, the EU has chosen to use an adaptation communication as the main vehicle to report on the key aspects of its policy on adaptation, including priorities, plans and implementation progress, as well as examples from member states. The document is structured following the reporting guidelines agreed in COP24 on the adaptation communication and the enhanced transparency framework.

The EU Adaptation Communication (European Commission, 2021d), referring to the EU Adaptation Strategy, contains some statements that reflect the role that the EU envisages playing as a partner in international efforts on adaptation:

- “The EU will continue to engage in international joint efforts to share information and knowledge about approaches to adaptation and practical experiences and lessons learned” (European Commission, 2021d at p.2).
- “This EU strategy also reflects the EU’s goal to act as a driving force for international adaptation action and climate resilience” (European Commission, 2021d at p.6).
- “Full implementation of the international pillar of this strategy would also position the EU as a key partner for developing country Parties in their pathways to climate resilience” (European Commission, 2021d at p.6).

The EU Adaptation Strategy (European Commission, 2021b), in turn, focuses on improving knowledge of climate impacts and adaptation solutions, stepping up adaptation planning and climate risk assessments, accelerating adaptation action, and helping to strengthen climate resilience globally. Some elements to highlight include:

- **It sets a long-term vision** that by 2050, the EU will be a climate-resilient society, fully adapted to the unavoidable impacts of climate change (European Commission, 2021b at p.3), though the strategy does not provide information on how progress will be monitored and assessed through time.
- **It states the need for concrete action at EU, member state and broader international level**, explicitly mentioning adaptation as a crucial component of the global response to climate change, acknowledging that the EU and the global community are currently **underprepared** to face climate change impacts, and that climate change impacts outside Europe are, and will continue to affect the EU through interlinked effects on trade or migration.
- **It makes the case for the participation of a broad range of stakeholders, beyond the public sector**, stating that the strategy “will support the private sector to identify risks and steer investment towards action on adaptation and resilience” (European Commission, 2021b at p.4).
- **It emphasises the need to step up the EU’s international action for climate resilience**, and that in this context, the EU’s climate change adaptation ambition must match the EU’s global leadership in climate change mitigation (European Commission, 2021b at p.18),
- **It will promote sub-national, national and regional approaches to adaptation with a specific focus on adaptation in Africa, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** (European Commission, 2021b at p.18).

- **It notes the EU’s history of cooperating with other countries on adaptation**, and that the “core of EU external action ...is based on resilience, planning, support for local groups, prevention, and well-informed decision-making” with NDCs, National Adaption Plans (NAPs) and other climate-relevant plans offering a solid platform for collaboration (European Commission, 2021b at p.18).
- It also **highlights the need for additional international finance** for climate change adaptation, both from public and private sources.

Overall, the EU can provide good examples of how to take forward efforts to mainstream climate change across government areas and into EU and national budgets. However, the EU and its member states are much better positioned than less developed countries to make progress in overcoming obstacles due to their greater resources. The EU here has an opportunity to **share good practices** that have followed from implementation of its mainstreaming efforts and Adaptation Strategy.

The EU’s Adaptation Strategy expresses the EU’s desire to match its global leadership in climate change mitigation with leadership in adaptation ambition. To this end, the EU could **provide thought leadership** in discussions under the Paris Agreement on the framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation.

The EU could also **share information** on its own EU member states’ progress in implementing national adaptation strategies and plans. The EU could also **enhance direct engagement and cooperation with individual developing countries**, to provide assistance in assessing and managing climate risks, strengthen planning and policies and enhance production of information that can support decision making – addressing some of the very concrete needs of developing countries.

1.C. Opportunities for the EU and its member states to stimulate greater ambition on adaptation:

- Exhibit EU thought leadership in developing the framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation.
- Share information on how individual EU member states are progressing in the development and implementation of their national adaptation strategies and plans, to enable others to learn from EU member state experiences, challenges and successes.
- Partner with individual SIDS, LDCs and countries in Africa, to offer practical assistance in assessing and managing climate risks, strengthening planning and policies, and enhancing production of information that can support decision making.
- Consistent with the EU’s adaptation strategy, scale up and enhance access to finance for adaptation, including through sustained contributions to funds under the UNFCCC that

cover adaptation, such as the Adaptation Fund, the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.

- Carefully craft messaging on the role of the private sector in supporting adaptation action in developing countries, especially in SIDS and LDCs, including on how private sector finance can complement public finance and by providing examples of success cases.

2.4 Support to developing countries

Under the UNFCCC umbrella, developed countries have committed to providing new and additional financial resources to developing countries to support implementation of Convention obligations on mitigation and adaptation. They have also recognised, explicitly, that the extent to which developing countries will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend upon the extent to which developed countries implement their own commitments with respect to finance and technology transfer (see UNFCCC Articles 4.1 and 4.7).

The EU has reports that it, its member states and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are the world's biggest contributor of international climate finance to developing countries, having provided at least a third of the world's international public climate finance, and contributing over EUR 20 billion per year since 2018 (European Commission, 2020a). In 2022, the EU reported that almost 52% of the international climate finance the European Commission provided in 2019 contributed specifically to adaptation activities, with another 28% supporting both adaptation and mitigation action (European Commission, 2022c).

EU member states have been major contributors to the funds established under the UNFCCC umbrella to support developing country implementation efforts. They have contributed over one third of the USD 10 billion mobilised for the **Green Climate Fund (GCF)** initial resource mobilisation and over half of the second USD 10 billion mobilised for the 2020-2023 replenishment (GCF, 2022). Over 86% (USD 962 million) of the total voluntary contributions to the **Adaptation Fund** through 2022 have come from EU member states (World Bank Group, 2022). EU member states have also contributed three quarters of the close to 2 billion received by the **Least Developed Countries Fund** and well over half of the roughly USD 357 million received by the **Special Climate Change Fund** as of 30 June 2022 (GEF, 2022).

Nevertheless, with respect to climate finance, the CAT's fair share assessment considers the EU's current actions to be "insufficient", and states that to improve its rating, the EU needs to ramp up the level of its international climate finance contributions in the period post-2020 and accelerate the phase out of fossil finance.

A series of broader targets on climate finance have been established under the UNFCCC to prompt far greater developed country support for climate action in developing countries. These include a commitment (not yet fully delivered) to **mobilise 100 billion per year by 2020**, extended through 2025 (decision 2/CP.15 and 1/CP.21), and a commitment to **double climate finance**

for adaptation from 2019 levels by 2025 (decision 1/CMA.3). In addition, negotiations are underway until 2024 to establish a **new, post 2025 climate finance goal**.

Significantly, at COP27 Parties agreed to establish new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in responding to **loss and damage**. Parties further agreed to establish a fund for responding to loss and damage whose mandate includes a focus on addressing loss and damage (decision 2/CP.27; 2/CMA.4). The EU has expressed its willingness to work on these arrangements; however, it has also emphasised that attention to mitigation could help minimise and avert loss and damage, and proposed that the donor base for a new fund should be broadened beyond the group of developed countries set out in the Convention.

Despite the proliferation of climate funds and pledges to do more, the amount of funding discussed under the UNFCCC is not in keeping with the scale of funding needed to shift emission pathways, or to support the adaptation or loss and damage needs of vulnerable countries.

The First Report on the Determination of the Needs of Developing Country Parties, prepared in 2021 by the Standing Committee on Finance, found that **costed needs for the implementation of NDCs cumulatively amount to USD 5.8-5.9 trillion up until 2030** (UNFCCC, 2021a).

The most recent UNEP **Adaptation Gap Report** found that adaptation costs and needs are five to ten times greater than current international public adaptation finance. International adaptation finance flows to developing countries reached USD 29 billion in 2020, but **up to USD 340 billion per year** is needed for adaptation by 2030, and far more beyond (UNEP, 2022b).

A **Report of the Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance**, has found that emerging markets and developing countries, excluding China, will need **USD 2 trillion each year** in climate funding by 2030 to help cut their greenhouse gas emissions and address climate impacts, with roughly half of this, or USD 1 trillion, expected to come from domestic sources and half from external finance (Songwe et al., 2022 at pp. 5-8). This report further found that bilateral **overseas development assistance** (ODA) for climate action from the governments of developed countries **should double from USD 30 billion annually today to USD 60 billion by 2025** and **the flow of finance from MDBs should triple from about USD 60 billion a year today to around USD 180 billion a year within the next five years** (Songwe et al., 2022 at pp. 12, 55).

Accordingly, it will be essential to both (1) enhance the scale of, and access to, climate finance made available to developing countries and (2) help countries make the most efficient use of their own domestic resources.

With respect to enhancing access to finance, EU member states are playing an active role in the **Task Force on Access to Finance**, a UK-Fiji led initiative aiming to reduce barriers and impediments for LDCs and SIDS to access climate finance and to promote a more coherent and effective approach among climate finance providers. The European Commission has also set up a **High Level Expert Group on scaling up sustainable finance in low and middle income**

countries, which will provide recommendations for a dedicated strategy for adoption in 2023 (European Commission, 2022f).

With respect to the scale of finance, at COP27, Parties called upon shareholders of MDBs and IFIs to reform bank practices and priorities to substantially increase climate finance, including by aligning and scaling up funding, ensuring simplified access and mobilising climate finance from various sources. By decision 1/CP.27, paras. 61-62, Parties encouraged MDBs to define a new vision and a new operational model, channels and instruments fit for addressing the climate emergency. MDBs and IFIs have been encouraged to deploy a full suite of instruments, from grants to guarantees and non-debt instruments, taking into account debt burdens and addressing risk appetite.

The EU, and US have both called for a reorientation of World Bank lending practices (World Bank, 2023b).

The European Investment Bank's (EIB) own **EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap 2021-2025** aims to support EUR 1 trillion of investments in in the "critical decade" from 2021 to 2030, gradually increasing the share of its financing dedicated to climate action and environmental sustainability to exceed 50% of its operations by 2025, and increasing the share of climate adaptation support to 15% of the bank's overall finance for climate action by 2025 ([EIB Group, 2023 at p. 11](#)).

However, it is unclear what portion of the EIB's funds will be invested outside the EU itself and for the benefit of developing countries. The EIB has said it will increase the share of financing it can provide for projects primarily motivated by adaptation to 75% of the project cost globally and to 100% in LDCs and SIDS (European Commission, 2022c).

The EIB has also put in place a **PATH framework** (EIB Group, 2023), to require that borrowers that are engaged in high-emitting or highly vulnerable activities develop a Paris alignment plan, with a mid-term carbon emissions reduction target and longer-term options to achieve carbon neutrality (Ibid.). If they wish to access EIB support, borrowers cannot engage in activities inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals (e.g., investing in new coal-fired power plants, new drilling for oil and gas in the Arctic, destruction of major sinks through direct land use change). However, the EIB may nevertheless invest in the oil and gas industry where it deems that certain innovative technologies will benefit from support (e.g., carbon capture, utilisation and storage, floating offshore wind, renewable hydrogen-based fuels) (EIB Group, 2023 at pp. 12-13).

Barbados has been instrumental through its Bridgetown Initiative in calling for greater access to finance through reformed MDB and IFI practices. The **2023 Spring Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF** have resulted in a revision of the Bank's minimum equity-to-loan ratio to 19%, a hybrid capital pilot and a scaled up bilateral guarantee programme, with these elements having potential to add up to USD 50 billion of financing capacity over the next ten years (World Bank, 2023b). Further work will explore other recommendations of the Capital Adequacy Framework (CAF) review (World Bank, 2023b).

As mentioned previously, the French government will be co-hosting with Barbados a **summit on development finance** in June 2023 that will take up MDB and IFI reform. **The French-hosted Summit for a “New Global Financial Pact” offers an opportunity to the EU to significantly influence MDB and IFI reform.** This event will build momentum toward the SDG summit that will take place in the margins of the UN General Assembly later in the year, creating further possibilities to **align the development and climate agendas.**

Turning to the efficient use of domestic resources, **country-driven programmatic approaches** increasingly are seen as promising ways to support transformative mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, as contrasted with the traditional project by project model of climate finance (CIF, 2018). Examples of programmatic approaches to mitigation that have already been successful are the **NDC Partnership** and the **2050 Pathways Platform. Just Energy Transition Partnerships** also represent programmatic approaches to the decarbonisation of developing country energy sectors, with funding and finance pledged to support country-driven investment plans. These initiatives are addressed in greater detail in section 3.4 below.

1.D. Opportunities for the EU and its member states to stimulate greater ambition through support to developing countries:

- Increase efforts to accelerate and facilitate the delivery of financial commitments of developed countries under the UNFCCC.
- Press MDBs and IFIs to increase the scale and accessibility of funds on more favourable terms, e.g., through Bridgetown Initiative elements and debt relief/suspension.
- Increase investment in programmatic approaches for mitigation (e.g., JETPs, NDC Partnership and PAF, 2050 Pathways) as well as programmatic approaches for adaptation, through support for the development and implementation of NAPs.
- Establish and support partnerships between individual EU member states and individual developing countries, to facilitate NDC and NAP implementation through the sharing of best practices, and technical and financial support.
- Share lessons learned from working on the JETPs.
- Share the EU’s experience in generating financial flows and co-benefits from the application of its own climate policies (e.g., EU ETS), as well as its efforts to direct investments toward sustainable activities. Encourage individual EU member states to work closely with individual partner countries, upon their request, to provide technical support with analyses, planning, and policy development and implementation.
- Build trust, through the development of new loss and damage funding arrangements and through financial support to the new Loss and Damage Fund.

3. Leadership through international engagement and diplomacy

It has been said that there are four contending approaches to multilateral cooperation: (1) the **charter approach**, which puts the UN and treaty-based organisations at its centre, reflecting sovereign equality; (2) a **club approach**, which rallies established advanced market democracies as the core of an open, rules-based international system; (3) a **concert model**, in which the world's major powers work through joint action, tolerating their differences to address global crises and shared threats; and (4) a **coalition approach**, which tailors ad hoc frameworks to needs (Patrick, 2023).

EU efforts to stimulate greater climate ambition require engagement in each of these models for cooperation, due to the range of the issues impacted and the different national interests and situations of key Parties. To achieve Paris Agreement goals, ultimately both cooperation and competition will be needed.

3.1 Political engagement

Inside the UNFCCC process

At the core of international climate change action is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. Decisions that advance these treaties are taken at annual Conferences of the Parties by consensus. Annual COPs offer an essential opportunity for Parties to press each other for greater ambition. Announcements of enhanced ambition are celebrated, and usually reflect significant inter-sessional effort by Parties. They may also reflect significant diplomatic pressure received or financial support provided, to enable greater ambition.

The role of the host country as COP President offers significant political opportunity to shape outcomes at the international level. The COP Presidency also works closely with incoming and outgoing COP Presidencies, allowing for an extended period of influence. For example, the UK COP26 Presidency worked closely with former COP25 Presidency Chile and with Egypt as the incoming COP27 Presidency. The United Arab Emirates will host COP28 and is working with Egypt to deliver COP28 outcomes. In keeping with the principle of rotation among the regional groups, **the President of COP29 (November 2024) will come from the Eastern European States, which opens up opportunities for significant EU influence.**

In addition to moving forward the multilateral process, COPs offer platforms for **messaging opportunities** that can resonate with other Parties or with the broader public (e.g., AOSIS's "1.5 to Stay Alive"). The EU can use these messaging opportunities to seed demand-side solutions or impact personal behaviour (e.g., to press for sustainable lifestyle choices, through "eat green" or "travel green" messaging).

High level events at COP28 in connection with the **Global Stocktake**, the **Mitigation Work Programme** and the new **work programme on just transition** agreed at COP27 will also offer an opportunity for the EU to shape potentially lasting outcomes.

The first of the five-yearly **Global Stocktakes (GST)**, established under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, will assess whether the required ambition is being achieved across all elements of the Paris Agreement, including adaptation, mitigation, means of implementation, loss and damage and response measures and identify opportunities for enhanced action and support to close the gap to achievement. Under Article 4.9, the new NDCs that Parties submit in 2025 for 2035 are to be informed by GST outcomes; under Article 14, GST outcomes are also to inform Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support, and in enhancing international cooperation. **Hence the first GST is a major test of whether the Paris Agreement's bottom-up structure can work to keep 1.5°C within reach.** Given the current low level of ambition across all elements of the Paris Agreement, **the EU can help the GST inject political momentum and technical ambition** into implementation, with a specific focus on needs in connection with short-term ambition (pre-2030) and on longer-term ambition in line with the Agreement's goals. Following a series of technical assessments and dialogues, and summary reports and synthesis reports, the GST process will conclude with high-level events at COP28, where the implications of GST findings are presented and discussed, leading to an appropriate decision or declaration.

Following the conclusion of the GST, **the EU can provide leadership on capacity building or coalition building** in the post-COP28 period around particular solutions that have emerged from the GST – to help countries develop the policies needed to implement NDCs, raise ambition, and address the impacts of climate change.

Under the **Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) the EU can bring greater attention to challenging sectors and give profile to promising sectoral initiatives.** The MWP was established at COP26 to urgently scale up mitigation and implementation ambition in the pre-2030 period in a manner that complements the GST. Under decision 4/CMA.4, the MWP will address broad thematic areas and include all IPCC sectors and relevant enabling conditions, technologies, just transitions and cross-cutting issues. A global dialogue at COP28 will bring together Parties and non-Party stakeholders, with investment-focused events organised on the margins with a view to unlocking finance, including for just transitions, overcoming barriers to accessing finance and identifying investment opportunities. The MWP can also be used to generate **momentum for implementation of existing joint initiatives** that have emerged in recent years, many of which have received financial support from the EU and/or its member states. It can also be used to **call for the further development of accountability tools**, to ensure that sectoral progress is being made, and that the support promised to induce participation in joint initiatives is being delivered.

The **work programme on just transition**, agreed by decision 1/CMA.4, para. 52, will consider pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, including the important socioeconomic

aspects. The work programme will hold an annual high-level ministerial round table on just transition, beginning at CMA.5, to which the EU can contribute.

Increasingly, the COP is used as an arena for the announcement of **new joint initiatives** by groups of Parties and non-Party stakeholders adopted outside the UNFCCC process, buttressing the decisions taken under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. These initiatives are typically launched among smaller groups of players, bring together fast movers, and increase the visibility of viable solutions. They also generate peer pressure and momentum beyond the first group of early members. Initiatives and partnerships are discussed in the sections that follow and particularly in section 3.3 below.

Outside the UNFCCC process

A significant cycle of political meetings feeds into and enables announcements of increased ambition presented at annual COPs. Some are high level meetings that take up climate change-related issues as part of their broader agendas (G7, G20, APEC Summit); others are organised specifically to address climate change issues (MEF, MOCA, Petersberg Dialogue, High Ambition Coalition, Japan-Brazil Dialogue).

By **chairing or hosting these meetings**, EU member states can impact narratives and influence outcomes by giving profile to preferred issues or outcomes during discussions, and landing preferred issues and language in the Chair's Summary, Joint Statements, Joint Declarations or similar event outcomes. The opportunity to **test, repeat and shop key messages** to various high-level configurations of countries, through attendance at multiple meetings with overlapping participants, also allows the EU to build efficiencies into its diplomatic efforts.

The G7 and G20 processes are increasingly used to shape messaging for the UNFCCC process and bolster momentum for Paris Agreement goals. Holding the G7 or G20 Presidency provides an opportunity to shape outcomes. The G7, G20 or APEC Presidencies are also well-situated to work together with a progressive COP Presidency and to give profile to technical work coming from the IEA, OECD, IRENA or other sources.

For example, under the UK's G7 Presidency in 2021, the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and the US, with the European Union (EU) participating as a "non-enumerated member") launched the "**Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)**," which aims to mobilize USD 600 billion by 2027 in global infrastructure investments across four priority pillars (White House, 2022) and which has been compared to China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Under Germany's G7 Presidency in 2022, G7 members recommitted to reaching net zero by 2050 at the latest and established a **Climate Club**, focusing on the decarbonisation of industries (G7, 2022). The G7 also welcomed progress on **Just Energy Transitions Partnerships (JETP)** with **South Africa** and **Indonesia** "as flagship projects for multilateral cooperation, just energy transition and sustainable investment," and noted negotiations on JETPs with **Vietnam, India and Senegal** (G7, 2022). G7 energy and environment ministers agreed to **end taxpayer**

funding for oil, gas and coal projects overseas (though the press was quick to point out that most public and private funding for these projects comes from outside the G7, the G7 had not agreed to stop its own domestic investments in these projects, and the UK had recently actually subsidised further oil and gas exploration in the North Sea) (G7, 2022; Harvey, 2021). In April 2023, G7 climate, energy and environment ministers agreed to “lead by example” in implementing mitigation action to keep 1.5°C in reach. They called on all Parties to commit at COP28 to **peak global emissions immediately and no later than 2025, and to commit to net zero by 2050**. The Communiqué also appends a list of **Principles of High Integrity Carbon Markets**.

The G20 is another high-profile forum which paves the way for agreements within the UNFCCC process across major developed and developing countries. The G20 bring together countries that account for 85% of the world’s economic output and two-thirds of its population. Participating developing countries include Brazil, India, Argentina, China, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. India currently holds the G20 presidency under the theme of ‘One Earth One Family One Future’. India will focus on its LIFE programme – emphasising the ability to influence emissions through lifestyle choices. The IEA and OECD support the G20 Presidency’s work and the current Indian G20 Presidency is supported by the previous Presidency (Indonesia) and the next Presidency (Brazil). Previous Presidencies have been held by Saudi Arabia (2020), Italy (2021) and Indonesia (2022). The G20 Presidency will be held next by Brazil (2024) and then South Africa (2025). The G20 India Summit will take place 8-9 September 2023 in New Delhi.

In addition to the G7 and G20 processes, a succession of high-level meetings between ministers can be used by the EU to highlight its priorities and set expectations for upcoming COP outcomes.

The Petersberg Dialogue brings together selected countries annually to prepare the ground for negotiations at upcoming COPs (IISD, 2022a). **The Ministerial on Climate Action (MoCA)** also focuses on the upcoming COP agenda and takes place annually. It is attended by ministers and high-level representatives from roughly 30 countries, including ministers from the G20 and chairs of key party groupings in the UN climate negotiations. **The Copenhagen Climate Ministerial**, held in March 2023, was the first political high-level meeting following COP27. It was hosted by Egypt and the UAE, as the current and future COP Presidencies, together with Denmark, to prepare the groundwork for COP28 outcomes. The **Japan/Brazil Dialogue** is also a ministerial level meeting held annually to identify priorities in the negotiating process at which the EU is present.


Energy-focused events also allow opportunities for EU political engagement. **The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF)** was created in 2009 by US President Obama to provide a forum for coordination on climate action before, and then following, the failed Copenhagen COP. At the third MEF meeting, held in 2022, the United States and Egypt announced that they would partner on adaptation in Africa, including at COP27. The US and EU, building on the Global Methane Pledge (GMP) launched in 2021, announced a new **Global Methane Pledge Energy Pathway**, which encourages countries to eliminate routine flaring as soon as possible, and no later than 2030 (White House, 2022). Other initiatives raised at the 2022 MEF, and supported by subsets of participants, included a **collective goal for the deployment of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs)** by 2030 of 50% of light duty vehicle sales, **the Green Shipping Challenge**, **the Clean Energy Technologies Demonstration Challenge**, and efforts to

enhance food security (IISD, 2022b). The 2023 MEF took up five themes: decarbonising energy; deforestation; methane and non-CO₂ reduction; carbon management; and climate finance (CNW Group, 2023). **The Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM)** is yet another ministerial-level global forum to promote policies and programmes that advance clean energy technology, with 29 partner countries and other participating countries (Clean Energy Ministerial, 2023).

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a trade bloc with the participation of a number of G7 countries (US, Japan, Canada) and a significant G20 overlap. The group has signalled its support for **fossil fuel subsidy reform**. The 2022 APEC Leaders Declaration stated: “[w]e recall our commitment to rationalize and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, while recognizing the importance of providing those in need with essential energy services.” As part of its 2021 APEC host year, the New Zealand Government proposed work under the APEC Energy Working Group (EWG) to provide an update on lessons learned and good practice from the eight APEC-economy **fossil-fuel subsidy peer reviews** conducted to date under the auspices of APEC and the G20. Although the EU is not an APEC member, the APEC link between the US and China in this forum is an important one. For example, the US and China have conducted peer reviews of each other’s fossil fuel subsidies. Importantly, **APEC is supported by the OECD**, which has now produced a study on lessons learned from these reviews, which identifies fossil fuel subsidies and their scale – finding that **government support for the production and use of fossil fuels across 81 major economies totalled USD 351 billion in 2020**, and amounted to USD 183 billion across 50 OECD, G20, and Eastern Partnership economies (OECD, 2021). **There is now potential to note and build upon this work under the UNFCCC**, as in the Glasgow Climate Pact Parties agreed to accelerate efforts to phase out inefficient subsidies and Sharm El-Sheikh outcomes (Decision 1/CMA.4, para. 28) call upon Parties to accelerate efforts to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

The figure below illustrates the overlapping participation in certain of these fora to show the different constellations of countries involved, highlighting opportunities for political engagement and momentum on priority issues.

Figure 1 G7, G20, MEF, Japan/Brazil Dialogue, APEC Participation



Summits

A series of summits in the run-up to COP28 will also provide the EU with opportunities for announcements that can positively impact global ambition.

To pave the way for COP28 outcomes, in June 2023, France and Barbados will host a “**New Global Financing Pact Summit**” to consider reforms to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and the issues raised through the Bridgetown Initiative. The Bridgetown Initiative, proposed by Barbados Prime Minister Mottley, proposes, among other things: restructuring the sovereign debt architecture to enhance liquidity and relieve debt in low- and middle-income countries; a greater redistribution of rich countries’ financial reserves and the mobilisation of private finance to mitigate vulnerability to shocks like climate change; and reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Hill, 2023).

In September 2023, a UN Secretary General “**Climate Ambition Summit**” will be held that will provide a focus for pre-2030 ambition. This will tie in to the Sharm El-Sheikh call for strengthened 2030 targets in NDCs in 2023 (repeating the Glasgow call for the same), the Mitigation Work Programme and the first Global Stocktake. UNSG summits can trigger a scramble for actions that can be packaged into announcements of enhanced ambition and it is already clear that the UNSG himself will be preparing strong messaging. Signals have been given that speakers will be filtered, to ensure that only those that can present enhanced ambition are given a voice.

IEA and Spain will host an international “**Climate and Energy Summit**” in Madrid in October 2023 to bring together energy and climate ministers and leaders from industry, finance and civil society, to build a “grand coalition” to accelerate progress and keep 1.5°C in reach (IEA, 2023).

Economic diplomacy

Climate diplomacy is closely linked with economic diplomacy. Funding and economic opportunity can create the space for movement and compromise, create momentum for positive outcomes, or avoid the blocking of progressive outcomes. COP hosts typically benefit from support packages during their Presidencies, to help them advance their own climate ambition.

EU member states can use their embassies and consulates in developing countries to offer support to host governments in increasing their mitigation and adaptation ambition, suggest host country participation in different existing joint initiatives or partnerships, or make general offers of support. These diplomatic approaches are typically most successful when accompanied by offers of financial and technical support for engagement, recognising the practical constraints many countries face.

Meetings of political and technical negotiators

Numerous initiatives bring together climate negotiators outside the formal negotiating process, or in parallel to the negotiating process, to advance technical discussions or to workshop ideas and options (e.g., the High Ambition Coalition (HAC), the Cartagena Dialogue, San Jose Principles Coalition, the Shipping High Ambition Coalition (SHAC) within the IMO). IGOs and think tanks also offer opportunities for negotiators to meet less formally to advance discussions (e.g., the OECD Climate Change Expert Group (CCXG), C2ES, ERCST). These are useful places for the EU to **socialise new ideas and options** that can in turn lead to or be supported by tactical engagement in diplomatic processes and negotiating processes.

2.A. Opportunities for the EU and its member states to stimulate greater ambition through political engagement:

- Develop supportive relationship with potential COP29 (Eastern European) hosts.
- Build on existing partnerships and relationships with upcoming G20 Presidencies, to help deliver progressive outcomes.
- Use the political phase of the GST in 2023 as a platform to urge additional pre-2030 ambition from partners.
- Use the GST outcomes as a lever for the alignment of EU goals with the UN Secretary General's acceleration agenda.
- Champion the MWP and GST to support systems for tracking sectoral progress and for the development of accountability tools.
- Provide active EU leadership on capacity building in the post COP28 period around particular solutions emerging from the GST, e.g., to help countries develop the policies needed to implement NDCs and raise both mitigation and adaptation ambition.

- Use diplomatic channels to reach out to individual developing country Parties, to find out what types of support could be most useful in enhancing ambition.
- Streamline JETP negotiations based on lessons learned and develop a framework for delivery of successful JETPs.
- Building on the GST and MWP, encourage all Parties to present economy-wide NDCs that cover all sectors and all gases, aiming for a comprehensive set of second NDCs.

3.2 Multilateral treaty processes outside the UNFCCC

While the UNFCCC is recognised as the central forum for discussion of climate matters, other multilateral processes also address the reduction of GHG emissions and have overlapping interests (IMO, ICAO, CBD, WTO, Montreal Protocol and plastics treaty now under negotiation). The multilateral treaty processes most directly addressing the reduction of emissions are ICAO, IMO, and the Montreal Protocol, though others also hold potential to direct resources in support of the green transition, and to support adaptation and the minimisation of climate impacts (e.g., WTO, CBD). The EU's efforts within and around these processes can accelerate action toward climate goals and address gaps.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – aviation emissions

In 2021, aviation represented just over 2% of global emissions (IEA, 2022a). The IEA has flagged this sector as not consistent with the IEA's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (Ibid.).

In 2010, ICAO adopted a goal of **carbon neutral growth from 2020**, with this goal to be delivered through efficiency measures and through CORSIA (the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation). CORSIA requires aviation operators to cancel offsets equal in amount to their CO₂ emissions that exceed an agreed baseline. CORSIA has a pilot phase (2021-2023), a first phase (2024-2026), and a second phase (2027-2035). For the first two phases (2021-2026), participation is voluntary. From 2027 onwards, participation is mandatory, with a number of exemptions (e.g., for SIDS, LDCs, land-locked developing countries) unless exempted countries participate on a voluntary basis ²¹¹ CORSIA aims to cap emission levels at 85% of 2019 emission levels.

In late 2022, ICAO adopted an aspirational global fuel efficiency improvement rate of **2% per annum** from 2021 to 2050; a **medium term** global aspirational goal of keeping the global net carbon emissions from international aviation from 2020 at the same level; and a **long-term** global aspirational goal (LTAG) of **net-zero carbon emissions by 2050** in support of the Paris Agreement's temperature goal (ICAO, 2022). Nevertheless, ICAO carbon emission goals remain insufficiently ambitious in the near term.

To maintain pressure on ICAO, the EU's Fit for 55 package states that in 2026, after the 41st ICAO Assembly in 2025 has concluded, the Commission will carry out an assessment of CORSIA to see if it is sufficiently delivering on the goals of the Paris Agreement. If in the EU's view CORSIA is not sufficiently aligned with the Paris Agreement, the Commission will make a legislative proposal that could extend the EU ETS to departing flights (European Commission, 2022d). Currently, the EU ETS applies to flights solely within the EU and EEA, and outgoing flights to Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The EU's previous threats to include international aviation emissions within the EU ETS have helped drive global ambition under ICAO. The EU ETS originally was to include all flights entering and leaving the EU from 2012. When this proposal received push back from non-EU countries, the EU agreed to "stop the clock" – for one year – to allow ICAO time to develop a globally-applicable market-based measure to address emissions from international aviation – which ultimately became CORSIA (European Commission, 2012). This suspension was subsequently extended to 2017, then to 2023 and now most recently to 2027 in the context of the Fit for 55 package. The EU estimates that inclusion of domestic aviation emissions in the EU ETS has contributed to reducing the carbon footprint of the aviation sector by more than 17 million tonnes per year (European Commission, 2023d).

Under the **ReFuelEU Aviation** proposal, which is part of the Fit for 55 package, the EU will also require jet fuel suppliers to blend in sustainable aviation fuels (SAFs) into the fuel provided to airports in the EU. Flights will have to carry this minimum amount of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), whether they are operated by an EU airline or not. The binding SAF target starts with 2% in 2025 and increases to 5% in 2030, 20% in 2035 and up to 63% by 2050. SAF targets will help with decarbonisation of the sector beyond the EU.

The climate impact of **non-CO₂ effects** is two thirds of aviation's total climate impact (Transport and Environment, 2021). The EU Council and Parliament have agreed that the Commission will implement a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system for non-CO₂ effects in aviation from 2025. By 2027, the Commission will submit a report based on the MRV and by 2028, after an impact assessment, the Commission will make a proposal to address non-CO₂ effects (European Council, 2022). Incorporating these impacts within the EU's regulation of the sector will put pressure on ICAO to take action in this area.

Areas for additional engagement by the EU within ICAO might include: pressure to increase the quality of the offsets accepted within CORSIA under that programme's emissions unit criteria (which currently allows CERs, renewable energy based credits and land sector offsets); pressure to include non-CO₂ impacts on warming from aviation within CORSIA offsetting requirements (rather than addressing these impacts just through SAF); renewed pressure to lower the CORSIA offsetting baseline; and encouragement of CORSIA participation among a broader group of Parties.

International Maritime Organization (IMO) – shipping emissions

Emissions from all shipping constitutes roughly 2-3% of global emissions (UMAS, 2021). Emissions from international maritime transport accounted for approximately 1.5% of total global emissions

in 2019 and 2% of global energy-related CO₂ emissions. The IEA has flagged the international shipping sector as not consistent with the IEA's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (IEA, 2022b).

GHGs from international shipping are regulated by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The EU is not a direct member of the IMO and EU member states do not negotiate as a bloc in the IMO.

In 2018 the IMO adopted its Initial GHG Strategy on the reduction of GHG emissions from shipping, which has as its main goals to cut annual GHGs from international shipping by at least half by 2050, compared with 2008 levels, and work towards phasing out GHG emissions from shipping entirely as soon as possible in this century. The Initial GHG Strategy envisages a reduction in carbon intensity of international shipping on average by at least 40% by 2030, and pursuing efforts towards 70% by 2050 compared to 2008. The strategy includes a series of mid and long-term measures that build on energy efficiency measures already in place. These include both technical and operational measures.

The IMO's Initial GHG Strategy is due to be revised in 2023. The IMO is expected to adopt a Revised IMO GHG Strategy that sets an emission reduction target and adopts regulatory measures for achieving this target. To be Paris Agreement consistent, the sector will have to go to zero emissions by 2050 at the latest, with approximately a 40% reduction by 2030 and near a 100% cut by 2040 (Smith et al., 2021a). Parties are also debating what types of economic measures to put in place to ensure a price on carbon (a levy, feebate or ETS), the scale of any such measure, and the beneficiaries and allocation of revenues raised through such measures. Options for beneficiaries include the maritime sector, the development of zero emission fuels, developing countries vulnerable to climate impacts and/or LDCs and SIDS for support with mitigation and adaptation measures. The shipping sector has expressed support for adoption of a flat levy, so it is likely that some form of economic measure will be agreed (Howard, 2023). The amount of revenues that may be raised through a levy could be significant, into the tens of billions per year.

Issues relevant for global ambition that remain to be resolved include: the scale of the emission reduction target, the timeframe for its achievement, the nature of the target (a more ambitious "zero" emission target or a "net zero" target); well-to-wake application, to capture the full lifecycle of emissions to and ensure that zero emission fuels do not lead to more emissions on land; and the allocation of revenues, which also involves issues of equity (Smith et al., 2021a).

Within the EU, the Fit for 55 package now includes maritime shipping within the EU ETS, with allowances to be surrendered from 2024 (*EU ETS*, 2023). The EU ETS will cover 100% of emissions on voyages and port calls within the EU/EEA, and 50% of emissions on voyages into or out of the EU/EEA. The obligation for shipping companies to surrender allowances will be phased in gradually with 40% for verified emissions from 2024, 70% for 2025 and 100% for 2026. Requirements depend on vessel size, with most large vessels included from the outset. Non-CO₂ emissions (methane and N₂O) will be included in the MRV regulation from 2024 and in the EU ETS from 2026 (European Commission, 2022e).

The FuelEU Maritime proposal sets a fuel standard for ships and requires the most polluting ship types to use onshore electricity when in port. The aim of the initiative is to increase the demand for renewable and low-carbon fuels and reduce emissions from the maritime sector (European Council, 2023). Political agreement now has been reached within the EU on GHG emission intensity reduction targets for vessels interacting with EEA ports.

The EU's leadership role in this area is recognised (Smith et al., 2021b), though more can be done. **Areas for additional engagement by the EU within IMO to secure Paris-alignment might include:** support for an unambiguous signal of long-run intent from the IMO, with diplomatic efforts to rally support in advance of the July MEPC session for Paris-compliant targets of zero (not net zero) emissions by 2050 at the latest, calculated well to wake, with approximately a 40% reduction by 2030 and near a 100% cut by 2040; a substantial price on carbon and an allocation of resulting revenues completely or in substantial part to LDCs and SIDS; engagement with a united EU voice, or strong EU and EEA member voices, recognising that at the IMO the EU is not a single party.

World Trade Organisation (WTO) – trade and climate

The WTO provides a set of rules to address unfair and discriminatory trade practices. Progressive climate action can generate friction with trade partners if it is perceived as hiding protectionist or discriminatory intent or having a discriminatory impact among trading partners. Commentators have identified a series of possible options to address the climate-trade overlap. These include amending Article XX of the GATT to explicitly accommodate climate change measures or measures taken pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements, or amending the SCM Agreement to provide space for green subsidies; waiving specific WTO obligations” (Bacchus, 2017); authoritative interpretations in favour of Paris Agreement supporting measures; time-limited “peace” clauses, whereby Parties agree to wait a fixed amount of time before bringing challenges or applying retaliatory measures; or adopting plurilateral agreements under Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement (Droghe et al., 2016). None of these options seems likely in the near term.

The EU states that it continues to play a leading role in the WTO's ongoing reform process, launched at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2022.² The EU is seeking increasing discussions on the trade-climate interface, potentially to lay the groundwork for future formal negotiations between WTO Members. It has proposed three thematic areas for WTO deliberative engagement: (1) trade policy and state intervention in support of industrial sectors; (2) trade and global environmental challenges; and (3) trade and inclusiveness. The 13th WTO Ministerial Conference will take place in early 2024.

In developing the EU ETS, the EU has sought to avoid trade friction, and the perception of unilateral action. This is seen in the EU's efforts over the years to address GHG emissions from international aviation and shipping, first within the UNFCCC process, and then through the IMO and ICAO and then through the EU ETS. It is also seen clearly in efforts to work on carbon pricing

² See https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-calls-wto-address-current-policy-challenges-through-focused-deliberation-2023-02-22_en

with other countries, and in the development of the EU's **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)**, which has been described as “a reaction to a failing climate diplomacy.” (Mbengue & Cima, 2022).

The EU ETS has previously issued free allowances to carbon-intensive sectors, at risk of carbon leakage. With the phasing out of free allowances under the Fit for 55 package, CBAM will impose a carbon price on imports of certain products in these sectors, to shield domestic producers from competition from countries with less strict climate protection rules and hence lower costs. The intent is to incentivise decarbonisation outside the EU and protect producers inside the EU from loss of market share, while ensuring that the environmental gains from EU regulations are not undone by replacement of less-carbon intensive products with more carbon-intensive imports. Imported products in covered sectors that are brought into the EU will face a levy based on their emissions profile; however, companies that are in countries with a domestic pricing regime for carbon that is sufficiently rigorous will not be required to purchase CBAM certificates when exporting to the EU.

CBAM is slated to begin in October 2023, with reporting obligations and then a levy applied at the market price of carbon from 2026. It will initially cover iron and steel, cement, fertilizer, aluminium, electricity and hydrogen. The US has now asked the EU for its steel and aluminium exporters to be exempt from CBAM, to end the trade dispute between the countries that originally began back in 2018, when President Trump imposed 25% tariffs on EU steel and 10% tariffs on EU aluminium, arguing that EU competition was endangering industries needed for national security (Pandey, 2021). Back in September 2022, the EU indicated that if the US had a comparable set of policies and a domestic carbon price similar to that of the EU, it could be exempted and become part of the “carbon club” (EURACTIV, 2022).

Since October 2021, the US and the EU have been working on a **global arrangement on sustainable steel and aluminium**, the “GSA”, after agreeing to temporarily suspend the tariffs that had been imposed by the US (Nardelli et al., 2023). The US and EU will share data to assess embedded emissions in traded steel and aluminium, with the aim of discouraging trade in carbon-intensive products (European Commission, 2021c). The aim is to complete the agreement by October 2023, when CBAM is scheduled to begin to operate through data collection.

Friction has arisen over the **US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)**, a USD 369 billion package of investments that aims to tackle the climate crisis through subsidies and tax credits to companies investing in electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies, such as batteries, solar panels and wind turbines – as long as the products and parts they manufacture are made in the US (Henley, 2023). The US Department of Energy estimates that the IRA could cut US greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030, contributing substantially to a 50-52% reduction by the US in emissions by 2030 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2022).

The EU has responded to the IRA with its own Green Deal Industrial Plan. This includes a proposed **Net-Zero Industry Act**, under which 40% of low-carbon technology needs are met by manufacturing within the EU by 2030 for eight “strategic net-zero technologies”: solar power and solar thermal, onshore and offshore wind power, batteries and energy storage, heat pumps and

geothermal energy, electrolyzers and fuel cells, sustainable biogas/biomethane, carbon capture and storage (CCS), grid and technologies (Carbon Brief, 2023). The Green Deal Industrial Plan also includes proposals for a **Critical Raw Materials Act** and establishment of a **Hydrogen Bank**. The rationale for the EU's plan includes recognition of the trade implications of measures taken by other countries, including the US, India and Japan (Carbon Brief, 2023).

The G7 plans to launch a **"Climate Club"** at COP28 in December 2023 (building on earlier announcements), to try to defuse trade tensions (Monkelbaan and Figures, 2022). The Club's aim is to "raise climate action by facilitating a near-zero emission industrial production transition" and will be supported by the OECD and IEA functioning as its interim secretariat. A **Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate** has now been formed.

A particular concern identified with CBAM is its potential impacts on developing countries whose economies are particularly reliant on exports to the EU, and that will face a higher cost of exports to the EU. UNCTAD and other researchers have looked into the significance of CBAM for these countries (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 2021). UNCTAD found that the introduction of a CBAM results in declines in exports in developing countries in favour of developed countries, which tend to have less carbon-intensive production processes. It further found that the EU could consider CBAM flanking policies, including the use of revenue generated by the CBAM, to accelerate the diffusion and uptake of cleaner production technologies to developing country producers, which could be beneficial both in terms of greening the economy and fostering a more inclusive trading system (UNCTAD, 2021). There have been repeated suggestions that revenue from the sale of CBAM certificates be ring-fenced to support climate action in less developed countries or perhaps be recycled back directly to these countries if they are unable to establish a domestic carbon price (Monkelbaan and Figures, 2022). A recent report has reiterated that CBAM will have a disproportionate effect on low- and middle-income countries, providing additional support to the argument for revenues collected at the border to be recycled back to vulnerable trading partners (Carbon Pulse, 2023).

A clear link between CBAM revenues and support to mitigation efforts in developing countries would be helpful in expanding the Climate Club and ultimately landing a broad agreement in this area.

Montreal Protocol – Kigali Amendment – HFCs

Fluorinated GHGs account for around 2% of global emissions and 2.5% of the EU's GHG emissions. At the international level, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol puts in place a schedule for the phasing out of HFCs, which are a sub-set of ozone depleting gases that also contribute to global warming. Under the Kigali Amendment, Parties are required to gradually reduce HFC use by 80-85 per cent by the late 2040s. Most developing countries will freeze HFCs consumption levels in 2024 or in 2028 and then phase down from these levels (UNEP, 2017). A first group of developed countries is to reduce HFC use by 45% by 2024 and 85% by 2036, compared to baseline. A second group, including India and China, is to reduce by 80% by 2045. The third group is to reduce by 80% by 2047. There are exemptions for countries with very hot climates.

In 2021, EU-27 HFC consumption was 60% below the Montreal Protocol target recalculated to the EU-27 geographical scope (EEA, 2022). This is a result of the EU's adoption of its F-gas regulations in 2015. Under these regulations, the EU aims to reduce F-gas emissions by 66% by 2030 compared with 2014 levels, by limiting the total sales of the most important F-gases, banning the use of F-gases in certain types of equipment, and preventing emissions from existing equipment (Regulation (EU) No 517/2014, 2014).

In early March 2023, the European Parliament's environment committee (ENVI) voted for a steeper phase-down of fluorinated gases (F-gases) from 2039 onwards, relative to the F-gas Regulation timeframe, and a full phase out by 2050, through additional product bans on systems using HFCs by the end of the decade, commitments to combat illegal trade of refrigerant, and export bans on some HFC-using systems outside the EU (Merrett, 2023). Contingencies would protect the production of heat pumps that use HFCs, and consideration may be given over time to providing financial incentives for heat pumps that are designed for natural refrigerant. Accelerating the phase out of HFCs would support what has been called by the EIA "a long history of European leadership on F-gases" (Merrett, 2023).

Convention on Biological Diversity

In late 2022, CBD COP15 adopted the Kuning-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), which contains 4 goals and 23 targets for 2030 and 2050 (CBD, 2022). Among other goals, the framework aims to: protect at least 30% of land, oceans, coastal areas and inland waters by 2030; restore 30% of degraded ecosystems by 2030; reduce extinction rates; reduce nutrients lost to the environment by 40% by 2030; reduce government subsidies harmful to biodiversity by USD 500 billion each year from 2025 to 2030; and cut food waste in half. Parties (other than the US, which is not a Party to the CBD) commit to mobilize USD 200 billion annually by 2030 for biodiversity protection, with USD 30 billion for developing countries. Countries are obliged to monitor and report at least every five years on a set of indicators. The GBF is not legally binding and does not contain individual country targets.

GBF goals and targets and Paris Agreement goals are mutually reinforcing. For example, emissions from deforestation and land use change are responsible for roughly 20% of global emissions; food waste is responsible for roughly 6% of emissions (Carbon Trust, 2022). The GBF has potential to impact emissions in a significant way, but importantly it also has potential to support adaptation needs, by protecting and restoring vulnerable ecosystems.

Areas that commentators have identified for accelerating progress include mobilising funding, targeting of financial support to the most significant areas at risk of deforestation (Indonesia, Brazil, DRC), and elaborating more specific targets, including for addressing waste and overconsumption (Carbon Trust, 2022).

Plastics pollution treaty

In 2019, plastics generated 3.4% of global emissions, with 90% of these emissions coming from their production and their conversion from fossil fuels (OECD, 2023a). The OECD states that by 2060, emissions from the plastics lifecycle are set to more than double to 4.3 billion tonnes. (OECD, 2023a).

In 2022, the UN Environment Assembly endorsed a resolution to establish an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to draft a global legally binding agreement to address plastics pollution. It will address the full lifecycle of plastics, the design of reusable and recyclable products and materials, and the need for enhanced international collaboration to facilitate access to technology, capacity building and scientific and technical cooperation (UNEP, 2022a).

Since 1 January 2021, the EU has had in place a system of own resources, linked to the weight of non-recycled plastic packaging waste, which takes the form of a contribution by each EU member state to the EU budget (Council of the EU, 2020). The proposed revision of EU legislation on packaging waste as part of the Green Deal aims to make all packaging reusable or recyclable by 2030, reducing greenhouse gas emissions from packaging by almost one third (Symons, 2022). In November 2022, the EU joined the “**High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution**”, which aims to **end plastic pollution by 2040 (HAC)** (European Commission, 2022a). A strong treaty on plastic pollution, which restrains production and consumption, supports the circular economy, and achieves sound management and recycling, as called for by the HAC, would be consistent with the UNSG’s calls for an end to oil and gas exploration and exploitation and with the phasing out of all fossil fuels.

In summary, there is potential for the EU to stimulate greater global ambition in multilateral fora other than the UNFCCC, by signalling that it is considering opportunities to accelerate ambition within these processes to align with the Paris Agreement 1.5 limit (e.g., ICAO, IMO, MP). Figure 2 below brings together the percentage of global emissions addressed by various treaty processes, the long-term goals of these processes and options for stimulating greater global ambition. These options are also picked up in Box 2B for the consistent reflection of opportunities in this paper.

Figure 2 Treaty processes and options for increasing ambition

Treaty Processes and options for increasing ambition				
Treaty process	% of global / international emissions	Long-term goal	1.5°C aligned	Options for stimulating greater global ambition
ICAO (international aviation)	3% / 1.5%	Net zero by 2050	no	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocate for an increase in the quality of the offsets accepted within CORSIA, emphasising permanence, additionality and the avoidance of double counting and adherence to recognised standards for high quality offsets Press for MRV and inclusion of non-CO₂ impacts on warming from aviation within CORSIA; accelerate incorporation of non-CO₂ impacts in EU ETS

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signal the potential future need to lower the CORSIA offsetting baseline beyond which offsetting is required • Encourage broad and early CORSIA participation by Parties
IMO (international shipping)	2-3% / 1.5%	At least 50% reduction below 2008 levels by 2050, while pursuing phase out	no	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diplomatic efforts in advance of July MEPC session to generate momentum for Paris Agreement consistency, including mid- and long-term target • Seek Paris-compliant targets of zero (not net zero) emissions by 2050 at the latest: calculated well to wake, 40% reduction by 2030 and near 100% cut by 2040 • Seek substantial price / levy on carbon and allocation of resulting revenues all or in substantial part to LDCs and SIDS • Member states to engage with united EU voice speaking to feasibility
Kigali Amendment (HFCs)	2%			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support an accelerated phase out of HFCs at the EU and international level • Develop incentives for uptake of natural refrigerants
Plastics treaty	3.4%			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support an end to plastics pollution by 2040 or sooner via treaty negotiations • Diplomatic efforts in connection with treaty negotiation • Consider linking messaging to need to phase out fossil fuels

2.B. Opportunities for the EU and its member states to stimulate greater ambition through related treaty processes:

- In connection with **international aviation emissions**, advocate for an increase in the quality of the offsets accepted within ICAO's CORSIA, emphasising permanence, additionality and the avoidance of double counting and application of high integrity criteria; press for MRV and inclusion of non-CO₂ impacts on warming within CORSIA; accelerate incorporation of non-CO₂ impacts in EU ETS; signal the potential future need to lower the CORSIA offsetting baseline beyond which offsetting is required; encourage broad and early CORSIA participation by Parties.
- In connection with **international shipping emissions**, actively support and drive diplomatic efforts in advance of July IMO MEPC session and thereafter to generate momentum for Paris Agreement consistency, including mid- and long-term targets: zero (not net zero) emissions by 2050 at the latest: calculated well to wake, 40% reduction by 2030 and near 100% cut by 2040; seek substantial price / levy on carbon and allocation of resulting revenues all or in substantial part to LDCs and SIDS; member states to engage with united EU voice.

- In connection with **ozone-depleting substances**, support an accelerated phase out of HFCs at the EU and international level, and develop incentives for uptake of natural refrigerants.
- On **plastics**, support an end to plastics pollution by 2040 or sooner via treaty negotiations and begin diplomatic efforts in connection with these negotiations; consider linking messaging to the need to phase out fossil fuels.

3.3 Standard setting

The Paris Agreement has as one of its three aims, set out in Article 2.1(c) to strengthen the response to climate change by making “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”

In December 2016, the Commission mandated a High-Level Expert Group to develop a strategy on sustainable finance. The group’s 2018 report called for the creation of a technically robust classification system at the EU level to provide clarity on which activities qualify as ‘green’ or ‘sustainable,’ starting with climate change mitigation.

The EU’s efforts to set standards to promote sustainable investment and prevent greenwashing will have beneficial spillover effects beyond the EU. Accordingly, it will be important to get these frameworks right, both to ensure the EU’s credibility and to enable consumers to invest with confidence. Examples of some standards developed thus far include:

- The **Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSDR)** requires corporate entities’ management reports to include detail on their impacts on the environment and the climate-related risks they face, providing investors with reliable and comparable information (EU, 2022).
- The **EU Taxonomy Regulation** establishes a classification system to assist investors in determining the extent to which activities can be considered environmentally sustainable (EU, 2020).
- The EU **Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR)**, which aims to prevent greenwashing in sustainability claims made by asset managers, pension funds and insurance firms by imposing ESG disclosure requirements, supported by **Regulatory Technical Standards** that set out how this sustainability information is to be disclosed by financial market participants (EU, 2019).
- The **Proposed Green Bond framework** would establish a voluntary standard for use of the designation ‘European green bond’ or ‘EuGB’, for bonds that pursue environmentally sustainable objectives within the meaning of the EU Taxonomy, to avoid greenwashing. The designation ‘European green bond’ would be available to all bond issuers, inside or outside the EU, that meet the framework’s requirements, with issuers required to disclose how bond

proceeds will be used. It also establishes a system for registering and supervising companies that act as external reviewers to ensure that green bonds align with the framework.

- The **Proposed Green Claims Directive** would create detailed requirements that must be met before explicit environmental claims are made about products or traders in business-to-consumer commercial practices, to reduce the risk of greenwashing and ensure that consumers receive reliable information in making sustainability choices (European Commission, 2023c).
- The **Proposed Carbon Removal Certification Framework (CRC-F)**, which would create a voluntary EU certification framework for carbon removal activities that meet specified “QU.A.L.I.TY” criteria related to quantifiability, additionality, permanence and sustainability, again to combat greenwashing and incentivise the uptake of high-quality carbon removals (European Commission, 2023a). Certification methodologies would be developed in consultation with experts and stakeholders and implementation would be harmonised through public certification schemes. Certification methodologies would be prepared in connection with **permanent storage, carbon storage products, and carbon farming** (European Commission, 2022g). The proposal would also address rules for public registries of carbon removals.
- The **EU Green Hydrogen definition** establishes rules to define renewable fuels of non-biological origin and how to calculate their lifecycle emissions.

These and other standards will have ripple effects in third Parties and will impact investments both within and outside the EU. For example, an estimated 10,400 foreign companies are set to face reporting requirements under the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive because they have an EU stock listing; this will increase visibility on companies’ greenhouse gas emissions and plans aligned with the Paris Agreement to reduce those emissions (Holger, 2023). Roughly one third of the foreign companies subject to requirements are United States companies (Ibid.).

At the same time, concerns have been raised with the EU’s definitions under the **EU Taxonomy**, with environmentalists taking legal action over the inclusion of nuclear energy, gas, and forest biomass as sustainable activities (Greenpeace, 2022). Concerns also have been raised about the **CRC-F proposal**, including the potential this framework has for impermanent removals to replace necessary emission reductions, concerns over potential links to processes that generate fossil fuels (e.g., enhanced oil recovery), and over lifecycle emissions for processes involving biomass. With respect to the **Green Claims Directive**, Carbon Market Watch has raised the concern that “carbon neutrality” claims are not sufficiently managed (Diab, 2023).

To ensure the credibility of these frameworks, and prevent negative spillover effects, the concerns raised will have to be addressed. For example, the CRC-F may impact the development of standards for removals now under consideration by the **Article 6.4 Supervisory Body**, by cooperating Parties **under Article 6.2** or the development of standards in the **voluntary carbon market**.

The EU has been active in the negotiation of the **Article 6 rule set for cooperative approaches** under the Paris Agreement. This is another area in which weak rules can undermine aggregate mitigation ambition, and tight rules can help cooperative approaches contribute to NDC delivery. Previously, under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU impacted the carbon market by precluding use within the EU ETS of certain Kyoto units: CERs from the land sector, from HFC production, from large hydro projects, and N₂O-derived CERs from adipic acid production. Although the EU has not expressed an interest in engaging in Article 6 beyond the EU ETS's links with other countries, it may be worth considering whether a significant purchasing programme could send useful signals from the EU about the quality of credits expected under this Article.

2.C. Opportunities for the EU and its member states to stimulate greater global ambition through standard setting:

- Respond to concerns raised with respect to the inclusion of fossil gas in EU Taxonomy as an environmentally sustainability activity, particularly as the EU calls for energy-poor developing countries to phase out fossil fuels.
- Respond to concerns raised regarding the Carbon Removals Certification Framework, and signal that only those carbon removals certificates linked to permanent removals will be able to be used within the EU to offset residual emissions in hard-to-abate industrial sectors after ambitious emission reductions have been undertaken.
- Consider the possibility of a significant purchasing programme for quality Article 6.4 units, to enhance the EU's contributions to mitigation in developing countries and signal expected quality standards under Article 6.

3.4 Partnerships and initiatives

In recent years, diplomatic efforts have shifted from a focus on the multilateral process under the UNFCCC to targeted partnerships and initiatives outside the formal negotiating process. These plurilateral initiatives have enabled groups of Parties and stakeholders to work collaboratively on issues where a consensus in a multilateral process is not likely in the near term, encouraging members to be ambitious in their efforts and helping to ratchet up pressure on those that are not members to join. Partnerships and initiatives have generated momentum at a level that would have been impossible to achieve through the UNFCCC's consensus process, through the IMO or through other multilateral processes.

Two prominent initiatives, the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) and the Global Methane Pledge, illustrate both the promise and the challenge of this approach. Additional initiatives, addressing a range of different sectors, also have emerged to lay a foundation for future broad agreement across Parties.

The **Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA)** was launched by the UK and Canadian governments at COP23 in 2017. It is a coalition of national and subnational governments, businesses and organisations that works to advance the transition from unabated coal power generation to clean energy. It has 48 national government members and many sub-national government members. The PPCA declaration recognises that to meet the Paris Agreement, **a phasing out of coal by 2030 in the OECD and EU, and by no later than 2040 in the rest of the world**, is needed – **a target consistent with the UN Secretary General’s acceleration agenda**. Financial institutions that are members of the PPCA commit to the PPCA’s Finance Principles, which include no new financial services and investments for unabated coal-fired power and advocacy for the phase out of existing capacity. A PPCA Finance Taskforce was launched in June 2020 and a Just Transition Expert Group has also been created. The **PPCA website** tracks whether members are coal free, or whether they plan to phase out coal before or after 2025.

Researchers have considered the PPCA’s progress in mobilising a coal phase out (Vinichenko et al., 2023). They note that in 2018, PPCA membership was limited to wealthy countries with older power plants that used little coal and therefore did not contribute significantly to emission reductions. New coal phase out pledges have expanded to more challenging contexts and now cover 17% of global installed capacity, though economic and institutional capacities still limit the diffusion of pledges and the pace of decline of coal power is consistent with the historical pace seen in large countries. **The countries with the largest coal power fleets, but without phase out pledges, account for 83% of global coal fired power generation: Australia, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Turkey, the US and South Africa** (Ibid.). To be in line with 1.5°C or 2°C would require stronger effort from India and China than from OECD countries, they find, creating ethical problems and potentially feasibility problems, as these countries have less favourable conditions for a coal phase out. Although funding support can help address equity concerns, the amounts allocated through JETPs to date, for example to support Indonesia and South Africa, may not be enough to sufficiently accelerate a coal phase out (Ibid.).

A second high-profile initiative is the **Global Methane Pledge**, jointly announced by the US and EU in 2021 at the MEF in advance of COP26 in Glasgow. **Over 150 countries have now promised to collectively reduce methane emissions 30% below 2020 levels by the end of the decade. However, China and India, the two largest methane emitters have not joined, nor has Russia** (Volcovici, 2022). India has remained outside the GMP, for example, due to concerns about trade impacts and its economic prospects, as it has the largest cattle population in the world and it is a large exporter of rice (Ramesh, 2022). Three methane reduction ‘pathways’ have been identified: **the GMP Energy Pathway**, addressing fossil methane and flaring; **the GMP on Food and Agriculture Pathway**, addressing smallholder farmers and enteric methane reduction; and **the GMP on Waste**, working on tracking data from landfills and reducing methane from solid waste, including food waste. Funding is available for various initiatives within these pathways which may lead to expanded membership. Diplomatic pressure may broaden engagement.

Agriculture and food system emissions, now touched upon by the GMP, have been sensitive issues for the UNFCCC process. Yet recent literature has highlighted the need for greater attention

in this area if the 1.5°C limit is to be met. Crippa et al (2021) have setup a database of food system-related emissions. They found that in 2015, food-system emissions amounted to 18 Gt CO₂ equivalent per year globally, representing **34% of total GHG emissions**. The largest contribution came from agriculture and land use/land-use change activities (71%), with the remainder from supply chain activities: retail, transport, consumption, fuel production, waste management, industrial processes and packaging (Crippa et al., 2021). Researchers have now also begun to quantify the amount of warming that could be avoided by various mitigation measures in the sector, including **dietary change** (Ivanovich et al., 2023). One set of researchers has created a global food consumption GHG inventory for 171 countries, separated by gas, and based on full lifecycles of production. They have found that **global food consumption alone could add nearly 1°C to warming by 2100**. Seventy five percent of this warming is driven by foods that are high sources of methane (ruminant meat, dairy and rice). But mitigation measures could reduce this significantly. It may be that, despite the absence of key countries, solutions found through GMP efforts will nonetheless be picked up and applied by countries outside the partnership over time.

Carbon pricing is also an area in which broad agreement has not been possible under the UNFCCC umbrella. The **Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition** (CPLC), launched in 2015 in conjunction with COP21 in Paris, brings together national and sub-national governments, businesses, and strategic partners representing civil society organisations, NGOs, and academic institutions working toward a carbon price applied throughout the global economy. The initiative maintains a carbon pricing dashboard (World Bank, 2023a).

Open-ended clubs and coalitions have been formed in response to previous and potential future trade frictions resulting from carbon pricing. The G7 has announced a **Climate Club** to accelerate climate action and increase ambition with a particular focus on the industrial sector, to address risks of leakage for emission-intensive goods, while complying with international rules. International partners have been invited to join and to participate in the elaboration of the Club's concept and structure. The Club will work with international organisations and stakeholders, and the OECD and the IEA have been asked to host an interim secretariat. In a related venture, the OECD has launched an **Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA)** which aims to help improve the global impact of emission reduction efforts through data and information sharing, evidence-based mutual learning and inclusive multilateral dialogue (OECD, 2023b). It will consider the full spectrum of carbon mitigation approaches available and their combined global impact, support individual countries' emission reduction efforts and help ensure that reduction efforts in individual countries are globally effective and do not just shift emissions to other parts of the world (OECD, 2023b).

Also relating to trade, in January 2023, the European Commission, EU member states and partner countries launched a **Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate**, with close to 30 developed and developing countries, including the US. According to the EU, the Coalition's aim is to "provide political guidance and identify trade-related strategies to adapt to changing climate conditions and extreme weather, for instance through the production, diffusion, accessibility and uptake of **climate-friendly technologies**" (European Commission, 2023b). It will "focus on finding trade-

related solutions to the climate crisis in line with the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and the Sustainable Development Goals, while supporting ongoing efforts in this area in the World Trade Organization (WTO)” (European Commission, 2023b). The next Ministerial meeting will take place in the margins of the next WTO Ministerial Conference planned in early 2024.

On finance, in pursuit of the alignment of financial flows referenced under Paris Agreement Article 2.1(c), the **Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ)** was launched in April 2021 by UN Special Envoy Mark Carney and the UK COP26 presidency, in partnership with the UNFCCC Race to Zero campaign, to coordinate efforts across all sectors of the financial system to accelerate the transition to a net-zero global economy. GFANZ is an umbrella entity for seven separate net-zero finance initiatives and includes more than 550 firms in the financial sector, including banks, insurers, asset owners, asset managers, financial service providers, and investment consultants (GFANZ, 2023). Members have each committed to the goal of net zero by 2050, in addition to setting interim targets for 2030 or earlier and reporting transparently on progress along the way. GFANZ members are helping mobilise support for JETPs. Since its establishment, the net-zero banking alliance has suffered defections both from banks objecting to requirements that are perceived as too onerous, but also out of frustration with some members’ continued funding of oil and gas projects, creating reputational risks for the initiative as a whole (Murdoch, 2023).

With respect to shipping, green shipping corridors have been identified as a promising way to kickstart and accelerate decarbonisation efforts at the IMO – a forum with a challenging combination of private and public interests (Smith et al., 2021a). The **Clydebank Declaration on green shipping corridors**, launched at COP26, aims to demonstrate that maritime decarbonisation is possible, while unlocking new business opportunities and socioeconomic benefits for communities (UK Government, 2022). A coalition of 24 governments, including EU member states and developing countries, have agreed to take steps to decarbonise a maritime route between two or more ports of two signatories or to decarbonise a domestic route. The goal is to support a transition to shipping via clean maritime fuels, zero-emission vessels, alternative propulsion systems, and to the global availability of supporting landside infrastructure (UK Government, 2022). The green corridors that are being established (e.g., Halifax to Hamburg, Rotterdam to Singapore) can be visualised on the Mission Innovation website, including by fuel and vessel type (Mission Innovation, 2023). The Global Maritime Forum has prepared the *Annual Progress Report on Green Shipping Corridors 2022* with further recommendations (Global Maritime Forum, 2022).

On road transport, the **Zero Electric Vehicle (ZEV) Alliance** began in 2015 as a collection of national and regional governments seeking to collaborate to expand the global zero-emission vehicle market and enhance cooperation on ZEV policies. The stated aim of the group is to work with stakeholders to make all sales of passenger, medium and heavy-duty vehicles net zero as soon as possible and no later than 2050. There are now eight country members including two EU member states (Canada, Norway, Chile, Costa Rica, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the UK), ten US state members and others. Participants aim to cooperate in setting deployment targets, sharing data and setting targets for further ZEV development in line with long term goals. This effort has now been given a significant boost by the US EPA’s newly-proposed regulations on

light, medium and heavy vehicle emissions, which if finalised will significantly increase the ZEV market in the US, and the EU's Green Transport legislation, which aimed to restrict the sale of combustion engines from 2035.

On energy transition, three **Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs)** signed over the last two years offer a new model to assist coal-dependent economies in transitioning away from coal. These partnerships reflect commitments to mobilise public and private sector financing over a period of 3-5 years to support decarbonisation plans negotiated individually with each country. JETPs are supported by different configurations of the G7 and partners (the US, EU, Germany, Japan, France, the UK, Canada, Italy, Denmark and Norway), along with multilateral funds and MDBs (Phillips & Ewing, 2022). G7 countries signed an USD 8.5 billion JETP deal with **South Africa at COP26 in 2021**, followed by a USD 20 billion deal with **Indonesia** and a USD 15.5 billion deal with **Vietnam in 2022**. The G20 President in 2023 is India, and it is anticipated that G7 members will press India for a similar partnership. The EIB has already announced that it would provide indicative funding of 1 billion to promote the green hydrogen sector in India (IH2A, 2001), so it may be possible that a future Indian JETP will incorporate these funds and build on existing EU-India bilateral efforts. **JETP countries are all linked by a heavy dependence on coal (South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam)**. **Senegal** is also in negotiations over a JETP, though it is a future gas producer for both the domestic and export markets, and **the Philippines** is also rumoured to be in discussion (Phillips & Ewing, 2022). In a separate initiative, at COP27, the US, the EU and Germany committed USD 500 million to support **Egypt's transition** to clean energy, which will enable Egypt to deploy 10 GW of renewable energy by 2030 while bringing 5 GW of inefficient gas-powered facilities offline and reducing emissions in Egypt by 10% (Gomaa, 2022). At the same time, it is known that there is a tendency to use Egyptian gas to meet European needs (Al-Youm, 2022). **Nigeria** also sought participation in a JETP at COP27 to help fund its 2060 net zero transition, based on the Energy Transition Plan it had developed (Schmit, 2022).

The funds made available and mobilised for JETPs are seen only as way to kick start transition plans. For example, South Africa's electricity utility Eskom has previously estimated that USD 30-35 billion would be needed over 15 years to make a just transition from coal to low and no-carbon sources of energy (Eskom, 2021) and it has been said that Eskom's plans would need to be even more ambitious to be consistent with a below 2°C scenario (Ray, 2021). Country-wide, South Africa's JEPT Investment Plan estimates that USD 98 billion is needed to support its three priority sectors (electricity, new energy vehicles, and green hydrogen) with investments in infrastructure, planning, skills, economic diversification, social and monitoring (Archer, 2022). Nevertheless, **Indonesia's partnership agreement may enable it to bring its timeframe for net zero in its electricity sector forward by 10 years. Vietnam's JETP may enable the country to bring forward its peaking year for all GHGs by five years, from 2035 to 2030**. However, the decarbonisation goal within a 'just' framework will mean that timelines have to be adjusted to take into account national circumstances. JETP countries face energy poverty, energy access issues and insufficient electricity capacity – it is essential that JETPs do not exacerbate these challenges by pursuing decarbonisation in isolation. Concerns have been expressed about the

equities of the JETP model itself and the importance of an emphasis on the 'just transition' aspect of JETPs (Germanwatch, 2022).

Figure 3. Just Energy Transition Partnerships

Country	Date	% electricity from coal	Funds to be mobilised (public/private)	Investment plan	JTEP Secretariat	Impact on previous targets
South Africa	Nov 2021	85%	USD 8.5 bn	Yes	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2050 net zero goal remains Accelerates decommissioning of coal plants to contribute to net zero goal Prioritises support for electric vehicles, hydrogen and grid connectivity
Indonesia	Nov 2022	60%	USD 20 bn (10/10)	Yes	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advances timelines of some goals 2060 net zero goal remains Reaches peak power sector emissions by 2030, ~7 years ahead of previous schedule Caps power sector emissions at 290 MT of CO₂ in 2030, down from baseline value of 357 MT of CO₂. Reaches net zero emissions in power sector by 2050, moving target forward 10 years At least 34% of all power generation from RE by 2030 Accelerates early retirement of coal-fired power plants Restricts development of captive coal-fired power plants
Vietnam	Nov 2022	50%	US\$15.5 bn (7.5/7.5)	Yes	By April 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advances timelines of some goals 2050 net zero goal remains Peaking year for all emissions brought forward to 2030 from 2035 Lowers peak of coal-fired electricity generation from 37GW to 30.2GW
Senegal?*		8%				
India?***		44%				
Philippines?*		58%				

> <https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/indonesias-just-energy-transition-partnership/>

*No JETP in place. Percent emissions from coal: IEA (2020): <https://www.iea.org/countries/senegal>

** No JETP in place. Percent emissions from coal: IEA (2020); <https://www.iea.org/reports/india-energy-outlook-2021/energy-in-india-today>

***No JETP in place. Percent emissions from coal: Phil. Dept of Energy (2021): <https://www.doe.gov.ph/coal-overview?withshield=1>

Government-to-government partnerships, like JETPs, have the benefit of being able to mobilise funds to support a negotiated and agreed programme of deliverables **at a scale** and **over a timeframe** and with a **flexibility** that would not be possible through established climate funds. Furthermore, they look at a holistic set of deliverables including decarbonisation goals, socio-economic goals and environmental health. This negotiation process is structured to create **high level accountability** on all sides. An agreement is in place, the impacted country develops its own investment plan, with technical support if needed, private sector banks and MDBs are tasked to help mobilise assistance. While the public and private sector funding provided is only a small portion of what is needed, the country-driven process of developing an investment plan – either before or after signing a JETP – is itself of value. The provision of a Secretariat where needed also responds to capacity challenges that developing countries have long expressed.

A similar external initiative, that brings together the public sector and private philanthropies on energy transition, is the **Energy Transition Accelerator (ETA)**, a joint initiative between the US Department of State, the Bezos Fund and the Rockefeller Fund announced at COP27 (US State Department, 2023). The ETA aims to catalyse private capital to accelerate the transition to clean power in developing countries via the voluntary carbon market. The aim is to drive private investment in country-driven, comprehensive energy transition strategies that accelerate the **deployment of renewable power and the retirement of fossil fuel assets** in developing countries, to strengthen and bring forward NDC implementation (US State Department, 2023). A voluntary carbon market (VCM) framework will generate credits representing verified emission reductions and make these available to the private sector and government buyers (US State Department, 2023). The ETA seeks to generate scale by aggregating projects across national and sub-national jurisdictions (Phillips & Ewing, 2022).

A look at 'harmful' subsidies, as called for by the CBD process, specifically in the agricultural sector, and from a country-driven perspective, **could be another area for collaborative work**, linked to, or separate from, Parties' work on methane. In 2021, a joint FAO-UNDP-UNEP report found **that 87% of USD 540 billion of support to agricultural producers is either price distorting or harmful to nature and health** and called for governments to rethink the way agriculture is subsidised and supported (FAO et al., 2021). It found that repurposing some USD 470 billion of support that goes to price incentives for specific livestock and crops, subsidies for pesticides and fertilisers, and distorting export subsidies and import restrictions could help transform food systems and achieve sustainable development goals.

The FAO-UNDP-UNEP report sets out a step-by-step approach that could be used by countries themselves to reflect on the potential benefits that are possible from repurposing subsidies, as outcomes are very context-specific. The report offers a six-step process: measure the financial support provided; understand its positive and negative impacts; identify repurposing options; forecast their impacts; refine the proposed strategy and detail its implementation plan; and finally, monitor the implemented strategy. A partnership between a developed EU Party and a developing country, or between multiple similar countries involving peer reviews, along the model the APEC process has used for fossil fuel subsidies, might be a beneficial way to begin sensitive conversations.

According to *The Breakthrough Effect: how tipping points can accelerate net zero* presented at the World Economic Forum, **positive tipping point initiatives** that focus on “**super-leverage points**” can be effective in delivering positive spillover effects to other countries and economies, even where government participation is not completely broad (SYSTEMIQ, 2023). Three super-leverage points could trigger a cascade of tipping points for zero-carbon solutions in sectors covering 70% of global GHGs: **mandates for the sale of electric vehicles; mandates for acquiring ‘green ammonia’ to be used in the manufacture of agricultural fertilisers; and the public procurement of plant-based proteins** (SYSTEMIQ, 2023). It should be noted that the proposed US EPA rules for pollution control from vehicles, if implemented, is expected to have a similar effect to a mandate on the sale of electric vehicles. Consideration could be given to whether these three tipping points are currently adequately supported by the EU through existing or pending initiatives and whether focused support can be provided for similar initiatives in other countries. For example, Germany has just announced in March 2023 that it will be supporting the production of synthetic fertilisers in Kenya, made with green hydrogen produced with renewable energy, rather than fossil gas (Euractiv, 2023).

In summary, many initiatives are underway, as can be seen from the extensive listing contained in the G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers’ Communique, dated 16 April 2023. There are over 150 initiatives captured on the **Global Climate Action Portal** (NAZCA) (UNFCCC, 2023) – which contains such a broad array of initiatives and actors that progress, and the significance of this progress, is difficult to track. A Yearbook of Global Climate Action, produced by the Secretariat, acknowledges this challenge (UNFCCC, 2021b).

A **single dashboard**, dedicated to progress across a set of key government to government partnerships and initiatives, could be useful as an accountability tool – to help assess whether the goals of these initiatives are on track to being met, what they deliver toward increased ambition, and with what gaps in membership and ambition. As an important by-product, this dashboard may also help indicate which partners may need support to meet a given initiative’s aims.

2.D. Opportunities for the EU and its member states to stimulate greater global ambition through partnerships and initiatives

- Engage actively in climate initiatives and partnerships, offering financial and technical support to developing countries to accelerate implementation and generate momentum.
- Support scalable JETPs in high-emitting countries, significantly increase the amount of public and private support available through these programmes, using these agreements to move partner countries away from future investments in coal and to discourage avoidable shifts to fossil gas.
- Take forward JETP-equivalent transformational adaptation partnerships for the most vulnerable countries.

- Use EU diplomacy to encourage adoption of ‘super-leverage’ points by governments at relevant levels: mandates for the sale of electric vehicles, mandates for acquiring ‘green ammonia’ to be used in the manufacture of agricultural fertilisers, and the public procurement of plant-based proteins.
- Progress conversation on the need to address agricultural subsidies and trade restrictions, within and outside the EU.
- Work with India and others to open discussions on possible initiatives related to lifestyle choices impacting diet.
- Support creation of a dashboard of key governmental initiatives and their progress, giving these initiatives profile and making it easier to visualise whether participants are on track and may require additional support or assistance for implementation.
- Push for accountability and follow through on initiatives outside the multilateral process announced at COP.

4. Recommendations

Opportunities for the EU to stimulate greater global ambition, leading by example and by action, and through international engagement and diplomacy, include:

Leadership through the EU’s narrative:

- Recalibrate the EU narrative on climate action to internalize the UN Secretary General’s acceleration agenda.
- Embrace the UN Secretary General’s call for OECD countries to reach net zero “as close as possible to 2040” as a guide for the EU and OECD countries in developing or updating of their NDCs and net zero targets. Earlier net zero targets will create the political space for developing countries that are able to do so to bring forward their own net zero target timeframes.
- Work toward a complete coal phaseout by 2030 across all EU member states, consistent with the UN Secretary General’s call for a phaseout by 2030 for members of the OECD and by 2040 for all other countries, and a halt to all new fossil fuel exploration, development and licensing.
- Maintain greater consistency in messaging on the need to accelerate the phase out of all fossil fuels across all countries, both within and outside the EU.

- Communicate openly the implementation challenges the EU is facing as a grouping of diverse countries in its own efforts to phase out fossil fuels and to implement the raft of policies it has already developed.
- Communicate messages that can resonate in challenging policy areas that require behavioural change – e.g., eat green, travel green.
- Acknowledge the accelerating impacts that are expected if the 1.5°C limit is exceeded, within the EU and elsewhere.
- Express a desire to go net negative in the longer term.

Mitigation that is 1.5°C aligned:

- Ensure action to implement all elements of the Fit for 55 package, to demonstrate progress in the delivery of the EU's NDC.
- Report on progress against internal EU targets and be open and forthright about barriers and challenges encountered.
- Update the EU's 2030 NDC to reflect the greater ambition made possible through adoption of key legislation related to the Fit for 55 package and explain how this NDC is 1.5°C aligned.
- Acknowledge that the EU hopes to significantly overachieve its NDC and will report updated 2030 projections in coming years.
- Express, in addition to its NDC target, a more ambitious aspirational or stretch goal for 2030 that encompasses the fair shares level of ambition.
- In response to the UNSG's challenge, express an intent to reach net zero emissions well before 2050, *and aiming for 2040*.
- Signal the need for advanced economies to go net negative in the longer term, which may give greater confidence to developing countries gearing up to participate in cooperative approaches.
- Encourage all Parties to enhance their existing NDCs by presenting economy-wide targets that cover all sectors and all gases, aiming for a comprehensive set of second NDCs.

Adaptation action:

- Exhibit EU thought leadership in developing the framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation.
- Share information on how individual EU member states are progressing in the development and implementation of their national adaptation strategies and plans, to enable others to learn from EU member state experiences, challenges and successes.
- Partner with individual SIDS, LDCs and countries in Africa, to offer practical assistance in assessing and managing climate risks, strengthening planning and policies, and enhancing production of information that can support decision making.
- Consistent with the EU's adaptation strategy, scale up and enhance access to finance for adaptation, including through sustained contributions to funds under the UNFCCC that cover adaptation, such as the Adaptation Fund, the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.
- Carefully craft messaging on the role of the private sector in supporting adaptation action in developing countries, especially in SIDS and LDCs, including on how private sector finance can complement public finance and by providing examples of success cases.

Support to developing countries:

- Increase efforts to accelerate and facilitate the delivery of financial commitments of developed countries under the UNFCCC.
- Press MDBs and IFIs to increase the scale and accessibility of funds on more favourable terms, e.g., through Bridgetown Initiative elements and debt relief/suspension.
- Increase investment in programmatic approaches for mitigation (e.g., JETPs, NDC Partnership and PAF, 2050 Pathways) as well as programmatic approaches for adaptation, through support for the development and implementation of National Adaptation Plans.
- Establish and support partnerships between individual EU member states and individual developing countries, to facilitate NDC and NAP implementation through the sharing of best practices, and technical and financial support.
- Share lessons learned from working on the JETPs.
- Share EU experience in generating financial flows and co-benefits from the application of its own climate policies (e.g., EU ETS), as well as its efforts to direct investments toward sustainable activities.

- Encourage individual EU member states to work closely with individual partner countries, upon their request, to provide technical support with analyses, planning, and policy development and implementation.
- Build trust, through the development of new loss and damage funding arrangements and through financial support to the new Loss and Damage Fund.

Leadership through political engagement:

- Develop supportive relationship with potential COP29 (Eastern European) hosts.
- Build on existing partnerships and relationships with upcoming G20 Presidencies, to help deliver progressive outcomes.
- Use the political phase of the GST in 2023 as a platform to urge additional pre-2030 ambition from partners.
- Use the GST outcomes as a lever for the alignment of EU goals with the UN Secretary General's acceleration agenda.
- Champion the MWP and GST to support systems for tracking sectoral progress and for the development of accountability tools.
- Provide active EU leadership on capacity building in the post-COP28 period around particular solutions emerging from the GST, e.g., to help countries develop the policies needed to implement NDCs and raise both mitigation and adaptation ambition.
- Use diplomatic channels to reach out to individual developing country Parties, to find out what types of support could be most useful in enhancing ambition.
- Streamline JETP negotiations based on lessons learned and develop a framework for delivery of successful JETPs.
- Building on the GST and MWP, encourage all Parties to present economy-wide NDCs that cover all sectors and all gases, aiming for a comprehensive set of second NDCs.

Treaty processes:

- Advocate for an increase in the quality of the offsets accepted within ICAO's CORSIA, emphasising permanence, additionality and the avoidance of double counting and application of high integrity criteria; press for MRV and inclusion of non-CO₂ impacts on warming within CORSIA; accelerate incorporation of non-CO₂ impacts in EU ETS; signal the potential future need to lower the CORSIA offsetting baseline beyond which offsetting is required; encourage broad and early CORSIA participation by Parties.

- Actively support and drive diplomatic efforts in advance of July IMO MEPC session and thereafter to generate momentum for Paris Agreement consistency, including mid- and long-term targets: zero (not net zero) emissions by 2050 at the latest: calculated well to wake, 40% reduction by 2030 and near 100% cut by 2040; seek substantial price / levy on carbon and allocation of resulting revenues all or in substantial part to LDCs and SIDS; member states to engage with a united EU voice.
- Support an accelerated phase out of HFCs at the EU and international level and develop incentives for uptake of natural refrigerants.
- Support an end to plastics pollution by 2040 or sooner via treaty negotiations and begin diplomatic efforts in connection with these negotiations; consider linking messaging to the need to phase out fossil fuels.

Standard setting:

- Respond to concerns raised with respect to the inclusion of fossil gas in EU Taxonomy as an environmentally sustainability activity, particularly as the EU calls for energy-poor developing countries to phase out fossil fuels.
- Respond to concerns raised regarding the Carbon Removals Certification Framework, and signal that only those carbon removals certificates linked to permanent removals will be able to be used within the EU to offset residual emissions in hard-to-abate industrial sectors after ambitious emission reductions have been undertaken.
- Consider possibility of a significant purchasing programme for quality Article 6.4 units, to enhance the EU's contributions to mitigation in developing countries and signal expected quality standards under Article 6.

Partnerships and initiatives:

- Engage actively in climate initiatives and partnerships, offering financial and technical support to developing countries to accelerate implementation and generate momentum.
- Support scalable JETPs in high-emitting countries, significantly increase the amount of public and private support available through these programmes, using these agreements to move partner countries away from future investments in coal and to discourage avoidable shifts to fossil gas.
- Take forward JETP-equivalent transformational adaptation partnerships for the most vulnerable countries.
- Use EU diplomacy to encourage adoption of "super-leverage" points by governments at relevant levels: mandates for the sale of electric vehicles, mandates for acquiring "green

ammonia” to be used in the manufacture of agricultural fertilisers, and the public procurement of plant-based proteins.

- Progress conversation on the need to address agricultural subsidies and trade restrictions, within and outside the EU.
- Work with India and others to open discussions on possible initiatives related to lifestyle choices impacting diet.
- Support creation of a dashboard of key governmental initiatives and their progress, giving these initiatives profile and making it easier to visualise whether participants are on track and may require additional support or assistance for implementation.
- Push for accountability and follow through on initiatives outside the multilateral process announced at COP.

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